Turkey And Russia In The Context Of Diplomatic Relations: Historical Aspect

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the study of Turkish-Russian diplomatic relations since the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood Between the RSFSR and Turkey in Moscow on March 16, 1921. The author notes the strengths and weaknesses of the diplomatic and political experience of cooperation between the two countries over the course of a century, as well as promising and problematic areas between Turkey and Russia at the present stage. The study showed that many problems in Russian-Turkish relations have not yet received proper understanding, since there are a number of contradictions and discrepancies between Turkey and Russia on many pressing issues, which confirms the complexity and multi-vector nature of bilateral cooperation. But already, based on the principles of the concept of real politics, we can note the sustainability and prospects of Russian-Turkish relations. Not the least important in strengthening the geopolitical ties between Turkey and Russia is the belonging of these states to the Black Sea-Caspian region.

Keywords: Diplomacy, treaty, USSR, Turkey, cooperation, crisis

Introduction

The study of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia is a problem that is quite well covered in domestic and foreign historiography. The scientific novelty of this study includes the analysis of Turkish-Russian diplomatic relations devoted to the 100^th anniversary between the countries, although the “diplomatic relations of the Ottoman Empire with European powers date back to 1454” (Vatanyar & Solomina, 2014).

Problem Statement

The relevance of the problem under study is caused by the extreme need to maintain multilateral and multifactorial cooperation between Ankara and Moscow in modern geopolitical realities. This need is inseparable from the fight against terrorism in Syria and the political settlement of the conflict in this country, from mutually beneficial strategic projects in the field of energy, military-technical, trade and economic cooperation, tourism.

Research Questions

The purpose of the proposed article is to analyze the main stages of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia over a hundred-year historical period. The purpose covers a number of tasks: to indicate the official point of reference in diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT), to determine the main factors of Russian-Turkish relations before and after the collapse of the USSR, to show the stability of a political dialogue, cultural relations, energy cooperation and the efficiency of diplomatic relations between the countries at the present stage. It should be emphasized that these tasks relate to a broader issue of the strategic interests in relations with Turkey on the southern borders, as well as the development of its strategy in opposition to the West.

Purpose of the Study

The results showed that domestic and foreign historiography pays a lot of attention to the study of the history of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation. This problem is reflected in the works of many historians, political scientists, sociologists. Such scientists as Kireev (2007), Kudryavtseva (2008), Vatanyar and Solomina (2014) and others study the bilateral relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation, their peculiarities, development trends and prospects. The studies of the above authors are distinguished by a comprehensive approach to the study of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia, in particular, they implemented a wide range of historical, systemic, geostrategic and political approaches. However, despite existing scientific advances in the field of identified issues, a number of still remain in the scope of discussion. Such sensitive issues as the balance of power in Eurasia, the Greater Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Syrian crisis, the prospect of diplomatic cooperation between Turkey and the Russian Federation at the present stage and in the subsequent decades of the 21st century require a special approach.

Research Methods

The following main methods were used during the study: historical-comparative and problem-chronological. The comparative-historical method in relation to the research topic makes it possible to distinguish the general and special in the development of diplomatic relations at various historical time segments between the countries.

The problem-chronological method of presenting the material makes it possible to understand the key events of the described period.

Findings

Turkish-Soviet diplomatic relations in the first quarter of the 20^th century. The 20^th century challenged the Ottoman and Russian empires thus raising the question of the future, territorial integrity, role in the Eurasian region and on the global arena before the countries. The Revolution of 1905–1907 in Russia and the Young Turk Revolution of 1908–1909 in Turkey exposed sharp contradictions and convincingly showed how the Turkish and Russian societies gradually realized the banefulness of the preservation of the old system and the need to modernize the country.

The political problems of that time came upon the future leader of the Turkish national liberation movement Mustafa Kemal. The October Coup that took place in Russia in 1917 led to the overthrow of Nicholas II and the destruction of the monarchy. The persistent struggle for power between various political forces and groups culminated in the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks led by V.I. Lenin.

In the bloody struggle against internal and external enemies in March 1921 the Soviet Russia won. The Revolutionary Turkey fought for its sovereignty against the Entente military bloc. The rise of the national liberation movement was led by Mustafa Kemal, who continued the war for independence until 1922. The victory went to the Turks at an incredibly heavy price, which led to the abolition of the sultanate and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic on December 29, 1923, and then the election of M. Kemal as the first president of the country.

Another important aspect that should be pointed out is that the end of the First World War and its consequences led to a radical transformation of the international situation, including in the Middle East. Turkey was on the verge of isolation from the outside world.

According to Kireev (2007), the first foreign policy act of the GNAT was an appeal on April 26, 1920 to Soviet Russia. A letter signed by Kemal was sent to Moscow to V.I. Lenin with an official proposal to establish diplomatic relations and with a request to help Turkey in its struggle for independence. Turkey undertook to “fight together with Soviet Russia against imperialist governments” (p. 121). The letter also noted that “Turkey <... > expresses its readiness to participate in the struggle against the imperialists in the Caucasus and hopes for the assistance of Soviet Russia to fight against imperialist enemies who attacked Turkey” (Foreign policy of the USSR, 1958, p. 602). The Soviet government was the first in the world to recognize the GNAT government and establish friendly relations with Turkey. In a response letter to the Turkish government, V.I. Lenin wrote: The Soviet government extends a hand of friendship to all the peoples of the world, remaining invariably true to its principle of recognizing the right to self-determination for each people. The Soviet government follows the heroic struggle waged by the Turkish people for their independence and sovereignty with keen interest, and these days, hard for Turkey, it is happy to lay a solid foundation for friendship, which should unite the Turkish and Russian peoples (as cited in Deev, 1958).

M. Kemal’s letter to V.I. Lenin dated April 26, 1920 is considered the beginning of official relations between the new Turkey and Soviet Russia. On May 11, on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Foreign Minister Bekir Sami arrived in Moscow to prepare a general treaty. The first official delegation of the GNAT arrived in Moscow later, on July 19, 1920. The meeting between Bekir Sami and his deputy Yusuf Kemal with the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin and L.M. Karakhan took place on July 24, and on August 14, the delegates had a conversation with V.I. Lenin. On August 24, an agreement on cooperation was drawn up. The sections referred to two forms of assistance: 1) weapons, ammunition, materials and money, 2) if necessary – through joint military operations. An important factor in establishing diplomatic relations was the free assistance of the Soviet state to the Turkish government. Thus, in September 1920 in Erzerum, 200.6 kg of gold in bars was transferred to the representatives of the Turkish government and military command (Bagirov, 1965). Cash assistance was agreed in the amount of 10 million gold rubles. It was equal to 1,250,000 Ottoman gold. The signing the first official document – laid the beginning for the rapprochement and strengthening of Turkish-Soviet diplomatic relations. So, the foundations of Soviet-Turkish friendship were laid, which became the most important factor in the struggle of the Turkish people for sovereignty. Since that time, the irreconcilable rivals for several centuries, as well as the participants in two opposing coalitions in the First World War, have sought peace and good-neighborliness.

The strengthening of the GNAT government forced the Entente countries to make an attempt to negotiate and attract Turkish nationalists to fight against Soviet Russia. To this end, the Allies invited the Sultan’s government and the GNAT government to a conference in London. However, the London Conference (February 1921) ended in failure, after which the Greek troops, with the support of the Entente, resumed the assault on the supporters of M. Kemal. Under these conditions, the Soviet-Turkish negotiations started after the establishment of diplomatic relations in the summer of 1920, but delayed due to the Turkish campaigns in Armenia at the end of 1920 and Turkey’s desire to capture Batumi, successfully ended.

On March 16, a Soviet-Turkish was concluded in Moscow. Both parties expressed a desire to establish a permanent strong relationship between themselves and an inextricable open friendship. The Soviet government once again confirmed its consent to the elimination of the capitulatory regime, unequal treaties and other claims of the tsarist government against Turkey. The Kara region occupied by Turkish troops and part of the Batum region went over to Turkey. It was agreed that the future status of the straits is determined by the conference of the Black Sea Powers. The treaty was extremely important for Turkey. Relying on moral and financial (including military) assistance that Soviet Russia provided to Turkey in the future, the Turkish people repelled the attack of Western countries on the southern border.

In a conversation with S.I. Aralov, appointed in 1921 as the RSFSR plenipotentiary to the GNAT government, V.I. Lenin noted that Soviet Russia would provide Turkey with all possible financial assistance, since they needed it. Only in 1921, the supporters of M. Kemal received more than 33 thousand rifles, 327 machine guns, 54 guns, ammunition, 2 warships and monetary aid from the RSFSR.

The development of good-neighborly relations between Turkey and the Soviet republics was expressed in the conclusion of the Kara and Ankara treaties. On October 13, 1921, the GNAT government concluded an agreement of friendship with the Soviet republics of Transcaucasia in Kars with the participation of the RSFSR.

A new round in Turkish-Russian relations was actively developed after the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. In this regard, it can be noted that in the history of both countries a new historical stage of cooperation began, now between the Republic of Turkey and the USSR, which lasted until the end of the Second World War.

On July 24, 1923, after lengthy negotiations in Lausanne (Switzerland), a peace treaty was signed between the Entente and Turkey. The meetings concerning the issues of the straits were attended by a delegation of the Soviet republics (Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian) that provided full support to the Turkish side. Under the Lausanne Treaty, the Entente powers recognized the independence of Turkey within Eastern Thrace, Asia Minor, the western part of the Armenian Highlands and the northern part of the Syrian-Mesopotamian plateau.

The Treaty of Lausanne was of great importance to Turkey as an act of recognition of its independence by the Western Powers.

The ruling circles of the Republic of Turkey hoped that after signing the Lausanne Treaty, Western countries would establish normal relations with Turkey on an equal basis. But instead, this laid the basis for artificial relations with the delay in ratifying the Lausanne acts thus hoping to achieve concessions from the Turkish government. Only in August 1924, the Lausanne Peace Treaty with all the annexes gained legal force. But even after that, England, France, Italy showed by no means friendly feelings for the new Turkey.

In contrast to the Western powers, the Soviet Union has always shown the friendliest attitude towards Turkey. The Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed in December 1925 between Turkey and the USSR contributed to the strengthening of the international situation of the Republic of Turkey (Gafurova & Zubok, 1945). The document was signed in Paris by Turkish Foreign Minister Tefvik Rushtu Aras and USSR People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin.

Turkish-Soviet diplomatic relations in the 1930s developed on a generally good-neighborly basis. Showing a friendly attitude towards Turkey, in 1932, at the height of the global economic crisis, the USSR provided the Turkish government with a loan in dollars, and on exceptionally preferential terms – without interest and with subsequent payment with Turkish goods. This loan was used to build the first large textile mill in Turkey in Kayseri with the technical assistance of the USSR, which products covered the largest part of Turkey’s need for fabrics, reducing its dependence on foreign partnerships. In 1935, with the help of the Soviet Union, a second textile mill was built in Nazilli.

Thus, even before the Second World War, the Soviet Union began to provide economic and technical assistance to developing countries, and the Turkish Republic was one of the first to receive this selfless assistance.

Turkish-Russian relations on the eve and during the Second World War. Since 1934, Soviet-Turkish relations have faced significant changes. This was due to Turkey’s accession to the League of Nations in July 1932, which was in the hands of Anglo-French circles and spread anti-Soviet propaganda. Under pressure from the Western powers, in 1933 Turkey extended the concession of the Ottoman Bank, the main lever of French and English capital in Turkey. In February 1934, Turkey entered the Balkan Entente and the interests of Anglo-French politics in Southeast Europe and the Middle East.

In 1933, Germany began to display great activity towards Turkey, competing with England and France. In 1935, England concluded the so-called Mediterranean gentleman’s agreement with Turkey, which was based on providing assistance from Turkey in the event of the Anglo-Italian conflict, and England, in turn, pledged to support Turkey in the upcoming review of the strait regime.

At the international conference on the straits in Montreux (Switzerland) in June-July 1936, Turkey, with the support of the USSR, signed a new convention on the straits, according to which the international control over them was abolished, and Turkey received the right to remilitarize them. Since that time, Turkey could unilaterally control the straits in peacetime and wartime.

However, Western countries have secured the right for non-Black Sea powers to conduct their naval forces in the Black Sea in peacetime under certain conditions with some restrictions. Nevertheless, in general, this convention was more favorable for Turkey itself and the Soviet Union than the Lausanne, although it did not fully provide for the legitimate interests of the USSR and other Black Sea states. The signing of the convention in Montreux took a heavy toll on the most aggressive powers of Germany and Italy.

After signing the convention in Montreux, England intensified the struggle for influence in Turkey, supplying it with a large amount of weapons. In 1937, Turkey signed the Saadabad Pact, which led to the creation of the Middle East Entente. In order to finally attract Turkey to the side of England and France, the French government, at the insistence of English diplomacy, decided to separate the Sanjak of Alexandretta, which became part of Turkey under the name Hatay in 1939, from Syria and join Turkey.

On the eve of the World War II, part of the Turkish bourgeoisie and landowners were focused on England, France and the United States, a significant part in military circles adhered to Hitler’s Germany, some politicians maintained relations with the Soviet Union. However, in general, the ruling circles increasingly departed from M. Kemal’s course of rapprochement with the USSR, focusing on Western countries. This was the result of the growth of the large bourgeoisie, which was increasingly allied with large landowners and representatives of the commercial bourgeoisie, interested in economic ties with Western countries, fearing the strengthening of the growing Turkish proletariat, which transferred its hostility towards communist ideology to relations with the Soviet Union. In the same direction, there was a gradual departure from state affairs, caused by a serious illness of Kemal Ataturk, which started in 1937, and then his death.

During the war years, Turkey remained neutral and, having concluded an agreement on alliance and mutual assistance with England and France in October 39, adhered to this line until 1940. Four days before the German attack on the USSR, Turkey signed a friendship agreement with it. It states that in embarking on signing this treaty between France, the United Kingdom and Turkey, the undersigned duly authorized persons have agreed that the obligations assumed by Turkey by virtue of the above treaty cannot compel it to act, the result or effect of which will be its involvement in an armed conflict with the USSR (Gafurova & Zubok, 1945).

In difficult military conditions, on August 10, 1941 the Soviet Ambassador S.A. Vinogradov delivered a message to the Turkish Foreign Minister Sarajoglu: The Soviet Government reaffirms its allegiance to the Montreux Convention and assures the Turkish Government that it has no aggressive intentions and claims regarding the straits. The Soviet government, like the British government, is ready to scrupulously respect the territorial inviolability of the Republic of Turkey. Fully aware of the desire of the Turkish government not to be involved in the war, the Soviet government, like the British government, would nevertheless be ready to provide Turkey with all assistance and help if it were attacked by any European power (Gafurova & Zubok, 1945).

Nevertheless, Turkey supplied chrome and other strategic raw materials to Germany, and allowed German ships to pass through the straits to the Black Sea. Expecting the fall of Stalingrad in 1942, Turkish troops concentrated on the Soviet border. By the end of the war, Turkey, after the decisive victories of the Soviet people, began to take the side of the United States, England and France and, under their pressure, announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. In February 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany, but did not take part in the hostilities.

Thus, Turkey managed to remain neutral in the World War II, thereby ensuring the integrity of the country. The Turkish embassy tried to bring this to the attention of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that in the current situation created by the war between Germany and the USSR, the government of the republic decided to proclaim the neutrality of Turkey.

Towards the end of the World War II, Moscow took an open diplomatic step, rather even a means to pressure Ankara. On March 19, 1945 the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Molotov voiced the need to denounce the Soviet-Turkish treaty to the Turkish ambassador in Moscow S. Sarper as having lost its former significance and requiring a number of adjustments.

At the end of the war, the Turkish government decided to shoot the gulf by joining NATO. The USSR was again in a dissenting camp (Daily News, 2004). In December 1945, the USSR’s claims against Turkey were voiced on the pages of the Soviet press. On August 7, 1946, in relation to Turkey the Soviet Union put forward a note on the Black Sea straits as leading to the closed sea, the control of which should belong only to the Black Sea countries. At the same time, the USSR conducted military training along the Turkish borders. As a result of the confident support of the Western allies, the Note was rejected by the Turkish government.

The “post-war” thawing of Soviet-Turkish relations began at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s after the conciliatory, “refusing” Soviet note of 1953, but it did not immediately become noticeable due to the events in Turkey in connection with the military coup. The governments led by Inyonyu were very cautious in negotiating with the Soviet Union on the normalization of relations and the development of cooperation. Turkey’s foreign policy was firmly linked to the actions of the United States, and the Soviet-American relations remained cold (Kireev, 2007).

Turkey’s foreign policy in the 1980s, as represented by the ruling circles, was built on ensuring the country’s national security. One of the conditions of security was the development of military-political cooperation with the United States, participation in NATO. Turkey also sought economic and military-political integration with Western Europe through its accession to the European Community. Within the framework of the national security doctrine, attention was also paid to the development of ties with the neighboring states, including the USSR.

Turkish-Russian diplomacy after the collapse of the USSR. After the collapse of the USSR, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia were rebuilt. In this direction, in 1992, an Agreement on the Basics of Relations was concluded for a period of 20 years with automatic extension every 5 years. In this legal document, Turkey and the Russian Federation position themselves as countries ready for an open dialogue.

An equally extensive area of cooperation in the 1990s was Russian tourism to Turkey, the legal aspects of which are documented. On March 24, 1995, the international agreement signed between Turkey and the Russian Federation paid special attention to the recommendations adopted by the World Tourism Organization in Manila in 1980, Acapulco in 1982, as well as the basic principles of The Hague Declaration on Tourism in 1989.

As the most important event between Turkey and Russia in the early 1990s of the 20^th century, it is worth mentioning the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, which, according to BSEC Secretary General Viktor Tsvirkun, over the 21 years of its existence has shown not only the effectiveness, but also the extreme demand of the countries of the Black Sea region. This was especially evident in difficult times, when not only political but also diplomatic relations were interrupted in several member countries. We have become the only platform for a dialogue between them. We fiercely exclude any kind of political aspects, concentrating only on economic issues. If there is a policy in our work, then this unique platform will cease to exist. Everything is based on consensus (BSEC, 2013).

Referring to the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey, it should be noted that Central Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus also attracted its attention. Turkey made a lot of efforts, supported by the West and the United States, to spread the so-called “Turkish Model”, which was actively aimed at independent Turkic states in Central Asia.

At the same time, the activity of Turkish foreign policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, in particular the nationalist statements of Turkish politicians and officials, seriously worried the Russian leadership. It should also not be forgotten about Russia’s interests in the North Caucasus region since the 19^th century. “It needed the Caucasus as a geopolitical space securing its borders from Turkey and Iran”, Abaykhanova (2013, p. 202) notes. In this regard, politically, as noted by Vatanyar and Solomina (2014) in the article, Russia’s xstrategy towards Turkey in the Caucasus is aimed at preventing the weakening of Moscow’s position in Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus. At the same time, relations with Turkey strengthen the globality of Russia’s foreign policy, its foreign economic potential.

The Caucasus and Central Asia represent a strategically important geopolitical region for Russia, which in the foreign policy concept and military doctrine is defined as “near abroad”. As a result, Russia managed to achieve understanding that the territory of the former USSR represents a vital region for it, and Turkey’s political experiments are unacceptable in this case.

The relative improvement between the two countries is observed in 1997–1999. We believe that the agreement on the supply of Russian gas to the Blue Stream gas pipeline was not the last in this direction.

There is another important area of Russian-Turkish economic partnership at the end of the 20^th century. These are the construction and contracting services of Turkish firms in Russia. As Kireev (2007) notes: As of July 1998, 138 Turkish firms were working in 533 construction projects with a total value of over $9 billion, with 22 projects each costing more than $100 million, and 347 projects each worth over $10 million. In 1990–1997, 42 % of all foreign construction contracts of Turkey were carried out in Russia, for which Russia became the number one market in contract construction.

Thus, the political, energy and economic cooperation of Turkey and Russia after the collapse of the USSR significantly improved compared to the cold war period.

The active increase in cooperation in the field of trade and economics, business and tourism, characteristic of the 1990s, during the period of perestroika shifted to a very decorous attitude on the part of Turkey towards the Soviet Union.

In general, when assessing the foreign policy of Turkey and the USSR and after its collapse, the Russian Federation can state that the core of these relations was and will be not so much economics but politics and ideology, as well as the topics that have become important since the 1990s – Turkey and the North Caucasus, Turkey and Russian Turks, Turkey and Russian Muslims.

Turkey and Russia in the 21^st century: a new level of diplomatic relations. The turn of the 20^th–21^st centuries showed the need for rapprochement in the context of global and regional security of the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation in the geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic directions.

High-quality diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia at the beginning of the 21^st century provided an open dialogue in all directions.

The Action Plan for the Development of Cooperation between Russia and Turkey in Eurasia signed by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries in November 2001 in New York demonstrated a new, more advanced level of cooperation – from bilateral engagement to multifaceted partnerships. A special impetus to the new phase of cooperation was provided by the official meeting of the leader of the Justice and Development Party of Turkey R.T. Erdogan with the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin in 2002 in Moscow (Putin, 2005).

Certainly, the meeting of V.V. Putin with Turkish President A.N. Sezer at the Malaysian Summit in October 2003 contributed to the consolidation of political contacts at the highest level (Putin, 2005).

In 2003, bilateral issues related to the situation around Iraq, the confrontation against international terrorism, the Cyprus and Middle East settlements, and the situation in Transcaucasia were also discussed.

The role of the representatives of the Turkish-Russian business elite in bilateral relations is important. An important step in this direction was the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and one hundred and fifty Turkish businessmen to Moscow in February 2004, which ended with the formalization of four protocols of bilateral cooperation in various fields (BSEC, 2013).

Undoubtedly, the first official visit of the head of the Russian state V.V. Putin to Turkey from December 5 to 6, 2004 ensured the transition to a new higher level of Turkish-Russian diplomatic relations, following which the Joint Declaration on deepening friendship and multifaceted partnership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey was signed. The multi-faceted partnership was confirmed by R.T. Erdogan’s return visit to Moscow on January 12, 2005. This time, six hundred Turkish businessmen visited Moscow (Putin, 2005).

The issues on expanding cooperation in the field of economy, energy, military cooperation and regional policy were raised in July 2005 at a meeting between V.V. Putin and R.T. Erdogan at the residence of the President of Russia in Sochi (Putin, 2005).

It is not difficult to notice Turkey’s special interest in direct cooperation with the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. There are strong business ties between Turkey and 40 regions of the Russian Federation and 150 Turkish companies and firms. This is facilitated by the Turkish-Russian Business Council – within the framework of the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK). The results of trade turnover in 2004 between Turkey and Tatarstan are very impressive. They amounted to about 1 billion dollars, Saratov and Rostov regions – 250 million dollars each.

It is known that Turkey is a major transit of Russian gas. In this regard, on August 6, 2009, Turkey and Russia signed an agreement on the construction of the South Stream, a Russian-Italian gas pipeline project that will pass along the bottom of the Black Sea. It was agreed that through the economic zone of Turkey in the Black Sea, the South Stream gas pipeline will deliver gas from Russia to the Bulgarian port of Varna and further to the north of Italy”. In order to implement the South Stream gas pipeline project, on October 19, 2009 the Turkish government allowed exploration activities. Russia and Turkey are working together to implement a number of other promising projects, in particular in the field of nuclear energy.

On December 1, 2014, at a conference in Ankara the Russian President V.V. Putin announced the closure of the South Stream project due to the non-constructive position of the European Union towards it. Instead of this project, the countries started a new project began – The Turkish Stream.

It is worth reminding that the development of trade and economic relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation was negatively affected by the emerging political crisis associated with the Russian Su-24M bomber shot down on November 24, 2015 by the Turkish Air Force.

In accordance with the presidential decree of November 28, 2015, cooperation in all areas was suspended from January 1, 2016.

After Erdogan apologized to Putin in the summer of 2016 for the downed plane, the leaders of the two countries decided to normalize relations.

A major event of the beginning of 2020 was the official opening of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline by the Presidents of Russia and Turkey Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Putin, 2005). Currently, other grand projects are being implemented between countries, topical and serious problems at the regional and international levels are being jointly solved.

Conclusion

According to the results of the study, we can state that diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Russian Federation have reached a new level of strategic cooperation.

The dynamic development of almost all areas of bilateral cooperation is confirmed by a message from the Kremlin press service of 13.07.2020. The report refers to a telephone conversation between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Putin, 2005). The call came from the President of Turkey, who congratulated Vladimir Putin on the successful conduct of a national vote on the approval of amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Along with this, topical international issues were discussed with a focus on the settlement of the Syrian problem, including in the format of Astana – based on agreements on the results of the Russian-Turkish-Iranian summit held on July 1, 2020 via videoconference.

The format of cooperation between the ministries of defense of Russia and Turkey, which led to the stabilization of the situation in Idlib and northeast Syria, was highly appreciated.

It was decided to continue to intensify joint political and diplomatic efforts in this direction.

The question was raised about the prospects for the resumption of tourist exchanges (in the event of an improvement in the epidemiological situation).

Putin (2005) expressed gratitude for the readiness of Turkish partners to provide assistance to a number of Russian regions affected by coronavirus infection.

The conversation ended on the desire of the heads of state to maintain an open dialogue, including at the highest level.

At the same time, the study showed that many problems in Russian-Turkish relations have not yet received proper understanding, since there are a number of contradictions and discrepancies between Turkey and Russia on many pressing issues, which confirms the complexity and multi-vector nature of bilateral cooperation.

But already, based on the principles of the concept of real politics, we can note the sustainability and prospects of Russian-Turkish relations. Not the least important in strengthening the geopolitical ties between Turkey and Russia is the belonging of these states to the Black Sea-Caspian region.

Thus, it can be concluded that the positive results of bilateral cooperation between Ankara and Moscow are ensured by the following important factors:

1. Qualitative and open political dialogue between Turkey and the Russian Federation supported by the necessary documents.

2. Modern classification of Turkish-Russian relations: "rhythmic diplomacy” or “new diplomatic relations”.

3. Russia’s broad economic presence in Turkey and Turkey in Russia.

4. Multifaceted and strategic partnership in the field of energy, as a prevailing factor in bilateral relations between countries.

5. Active cooperation in the areas of conflict resolution and counter-terrorism.

6. Struggle to preserve international and regional security.

7. Extension of cultural and social relations.

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