The Great October Socialist Revolution that took place in Russia in 1917 caused a strong resonance in the world and played a crucial role in the historical destiny of many peoples, including Central Asia. This event, as in the second half of the XIX century, turned Central Asia into the object of close attention of the imperialist powers, bringing in it hostility and at the same time geopolitical changes. The offered to the reader article is devoted to the events that preceded the national-territorial demarcation in Central Asia. There is no doubt that this process was possible due to many objective and subjective reasons of socio-economic and political character. However, the foreign policy factor was of great importance in this process. Proceeding from this, the authors of the article pursued the
Keywords: DemarcationCentral Asia; Turkestan; foreign intervention
The formation of the USSR led to the beginning of the national-territorial delimitation in Central Asia (CA). This idea arose in 1920 in connection with separatist actions in the province of pan-Turkists, who sought to create there the “Great Turkistan”. Its result was the formation of new Union republics in CA, together with the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) (1924), which included the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) as a self-governing part. In 1929, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was transformed into an independent republic within the USSR. This process became possible due to many objective and subjective reasons of socio-economic and political nature. However, the foreign policy factor was considerably important in this process. Nevertheless, the lack of understanding this aspect of the problem about the national-territorial separation in CA determines the relevance of the study. On that basis, the authors of the article intended to disclose the role of foreign policy forces, which indirectly predetermined the national-territorial delimitation of CA under the new conditions that emerged after the October Revolution in Russia.
Historians’ interest in studying the problem of national-territorial demarcation was always increased since the very beginning of the project implementation by the Bolshevik government in the early 1920’s of the last century. Moreover, like any other global event, it had its own specific dynamics. In the 20-30’s of the XX century, the propagandists, who were primarily employees of state and party bodies, were providing coverage of the process of preparing the national-territorial delimitation of CA. They took a direct part in the process of national-territorial separation moreover, they wrote about the need to create new national republics in CA (Khodorov, 1925; Maksum, 1929; Shotemur, 1929; Khodjibaev, 1929; Muminhodzhaev, 1930).
From the mid-30’s till the 50’s of the 20th century, the study of the national-territorial delimitation of CA was complicated by the intensified repression in the USSR, the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. Nevertheless, in the historiography of the discussed problem there were few scientific works on this issue. The collection of documents compiled by Fagnan (1940) and published in 1940, which is entitled “On the History of Soviet Construction in Tajikistan (1920–1929)”, is of particular interest. The scientist ascertains the available documents in his research work, rather than analyses them.
Nevertheless, Kosheleva (1949), Irkaeva and Nikolaeva (1950), Degtyarenko (1955), Nikolaeva (1955) and others have already considered the issues connected with the work of the Soviet bodies on the foundation of the Soviet socialist statehood in Central Asian republics in general and in every republic in particular.
In the 50’s and 60’s of the last century a new perspective of researching the problem of national-territorial delineation, the legal one, was defined. Lawyers of many republics considered it. For instance, Radzhabov (1957), Sabirov (1967), Tursunov (1957) etc. These authors wrote about the legal difficulties associated with the establishing the Soviet power in CA; its prerequisites; the process of formation and development of the Union republics; their legal development and made mistakes etc.
In the early 70’s-80’s of the last century there was a particularly high interest to the problem of the national-territorial demarcation of CA. Numerous works were issued, but they were little or no different from each other. Often they were duplicated by the authors of the Union republics and were not deprived of party conjuncture. However, at the same time they were devoted to various aspects of the problem of national-territorial demarcation of CA: legal, political, ethnopolitical, etc. (Radzhabov, 1970).
A critical look at the problem under discussion appeared at the turn of the 1980’s and the 1990’s, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The historians to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan went through the bitter dispute (Masov, 2013). They argued over the “clumsy” division of CA in the soviet past.
Purpose of the Study
Summarizing the review, we should pay attention that the majority of the authors approached the researched problem from the point of examining the direct consequence of national-territorial delimitation. Even those works that revealed the reasons of the necessity for national-territorial delimitation took into account the internal features of the historical reality, which led to the formation of national republics in the region. In the article, an attempt has been made to look at the problem from another point of view, namely the foreign policy
New research papers devoted to the culture and history of the peoples of CA recently appeared in the post-Soviet Russian historical science. These works gave a more bold opinion on the falsification of the regional history, thereby expanding the range of study of delimitation of the Soviet republics in CA.
Foreign scientists and politicians have closely observed the process of national-territorial demarcation as well. For example, the English researcher Jeffrey Wheeler in his book “The modern history of Soviet Central Asia” (Wheeler, 1964) described in detail the positive changes that have occurred in CA after the national-territorial separation. The book even contains photos illustrating the growth of the socio-economic and cultural life of the peoples of CA in the USSR. Some photographs displayed the positive dynamics of the development of the seventh Union Republic, the Tajik SSR.
Firstly, it should be noted, that the fall of the huge Russian Empire in October 1917 dramatically changed the balance of forces during the First World War in favour of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. The fundamental communist ideas of the Bolsheviks on the abolition of private property first in Russia, and then across the world, implied the destruction of the Western Civilization of that era. At the same time, the victory of the October Revolution was making its own adjustments to the plans of great powers concerning the already divided world. Western politicians regarded the establishment of the ephemeral Soviet power in 1917 either as the “small temporary power” of the Bolsheviks (Bailey, 2013) or as the weakening of the key player of the First World War, Russia, which territory could be divided later.
Without further ado, on December 23, 1917, England and France concluded a secret treaty on organizing military intervention against the Socialist state at the conference of the Supreme Allied Council in Paris. The Western powers began to make plans to overthrow the Soviet government and spread their “spheres of influence” in the expanses of the former tsarist empire. January 18, 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson sent a message to Congress, which was recorded in history as “Fourteen Points”. He suggested the possible isolation of numerous vital economic regions, including CA from Russia. It was said in secret comments to the “Fourteen Points” that CA would have to submit to one of the world powers, which would be given a limited mandate for a protectorate-based administration. At the same time, it was obviously implied that CA would become a US protectorate (Irkaev, 1963). Consequently, the world powers began to make their bets in relation to CA.
To this end, along the perimeter of the borders of the former Tsarist Russia, the intelligence activity of many countries participating in the First World War intensified. According to the Entente countries, CA was one of the weakest links of the former Tsarist Russia. Its unique location, isolation from the central regions, availability of rich stocks of cotton and its own government in Turkestan, gave the opportunity to the Entente to consider the Turkestan Republic as a special subject of international relations with which it was possible to conduct official negotiations. Almost all states, which had direct concern, began to send missions to the region that carried out not only diplomatic but also intelligence activities.
Americans Davis, Brannint and experienced intelligence officer Roger Tredwell actively participated in espionage plotting against the Soviet power in Turkestan (Inoyatova, 1964). The French did not lag behind the Americans. The most notable agent of the French intelligence was lieutenant Caodeville. German lieutenant A. Zimmerman and Bolbruk, the Belgian consul de Stark, a member of the Danish embassy captain A. Brun, a Romanian lieutenant Baltaroiu, members of the Swedish mission von Schulman and Studen and others took part in the intelligence activity in CA.
However, the intelligence activity of Great Britain was the most organized. Its activity was not accidental. In the unfolding new events, the Foggy Albion got the opportunity to rehabilitate for its lost policy in CA in the second half of the 19th century and to receive from it the long-awaited political and economic benefits. Thus, the new “Great Game” began for England in CA again.
England dreamed of expanding its colonial possessions and creating the “Turkestan Democratic Republic” with all its rich natural resources. However, during the First World War, Germany and Turkey became the main stumbling block in the implementation of ambitious plans. The fears of England were connected with the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the RSFSR and Germany on March 3, 1918, according to which the huge territory of the former Russian Empire, not only on its western borders, but also in the Caucasus, had departed in favour of Germany. During the spring and summer of 1918, German and Turkish troops occupied a significant part of the Caucasus and launched pan-Turkist and pan-Islamic propaganda in CA through their emissaries, for example, Enver Pasha.
The political situation in the region changed rapidly like in the “chess game”. The British strategists quite naturally feared that along the line “Turkey – Transcaucasia – Central Asia – Afghanistan” Germany would inflict an irreparable blow to the UK on its most profitable colony, India. Indeed, by this time, in this geopolitical link there were clearly two dangers for England: firstly, the probability of an outbreak of the general Islamic rebellion in Turkestan; secondly, the third Anglo-Afghan war dragging on in Afghanistan. According to the opinion of British politicians, the forces participating in these events could join the war on the side of Germany and Turkey (Kupriyanov, 2014). Therefore, as Hopkirk (1990) wrote, “they demanded by any means to spoil the game of Germany and, appealing to patriotism, to organize resistance of the local population of Central Asia against them” (p. 78).
With that in mind, in order to achieve its goal, England planned the implementation of two methods of action. Firstly, the deploying the large intelligence and reconnaissance network together with the power method of struggle in the province was prearranged. Secondly, inciting hatred towards the new Soviet power among the local people and providing them with military and material assistance in the fight against Bolshevism.
Without wasting time, England was one of the first countries participating in the First World War to take decisive action. Military bases were established around CA, in Iran, China and Afghanistan. These bases in Turkestan were supposed to be the starting point of supplying the White Guards, bourgeois nationalists and the emir with weapons, equipment and money. On August 12, 1918, the column of English military equipment led by General Wilfrid Malleson crossed the Persian-Russian border near Artyk station. The English government set the task before Malleson and following him agents, scouts, diplomats. The assignment was to get in touch with the anti-Bolshevik forces in Turkestan and the Emir of Bukhara.
Two weeks later, in the Turkmen Kaakhka, the British fought against the Red Army soldiers. This was the first and the only case in the history of Anglo-Russian rivalry in CA, when the Russians and the British shot each other (Abdullaev, 2009). On August 28, 1918, the Reds (two thousand infantries and armoured train) attacked Kaakhka, crushed the Turkmen cavalry, but they were thrown back by bayonet attack of Punjabis. On September 5, 1918, a company of the Hampshire Regiment and a platoon (2 cannonries) of the Royal Field Artillery arrived in Kaakhka. The British commander, Colonel Knollys, took command of the combined forces. In September, the Bolsheviks attacked Kaakhka three times, but were repulsed by the enemy. On September 25, the British received reinforcements, i.e. two squadrons of light cavalry, therefore Colonel Knollys decided that his forces would be enough to assume the offensive. On October 14, 1918, the Indians and the British took the town and railway station Dushak, 50 km to the East of Kaakhka, capturing 6 cannonries and 16 machine guns. Then the Reds forced the Indians and the British to retreat. However, during the first battle, the Bolshevik train with ammunition was exploded from the missile hit and the station was destroyed. The Bolsheviks could not use their armoured train, so they had also to run away to Merv. Colonel Knollys sent two squadrons of light cavalry to surround Merv. Conversely, the Reds, fearing to be cut off, had to move away to Chardzhou.
After that, the British government ordered Colonel Knollys not to move further to the East. The resistance of the Bolsheviks, among whom there were representatives of the local population, turned out to be too strong. In order to turn CA into the colony Great Britain had to change its tactics from resolute military actions to the agency work.
Earlier in the province, in the spring of 1918, the clandestine counter-revolutionary organization “Turkestan Union for the Struggle with Bolshevism” was created with the help of the British intelligence (This anti-revolutionary organization in many books is called the “Turkestan Military Organization” – TME, uniting whiteguards and officials, acted in alliance with local bourgeois nationalists.) . The agreement between British representatives and the leaders of the “union” was concluded. In accordance with that, the above organization assumed the leadership of all counter-revolutionary activities in the province. For the rendered material assistance, the Union was ready to admit Turkestan as the British protectorate for next 55 years. In return, the British Government committed itself to provide counter-revolutionaries not only with money, weapons, ammunition but also, if necessary, armed assistance to rebellious troops from the northern provinces of Persia. As the first advance, the British allocated 100 million rubles, 10 mountain guns, 40 cannons and a large number of rifles (Khasanov, 1984).
Furthermore, British agents Edwards and Houston were directed to CA. From the territory of neighbouring Kashgar, the consuls D. McCartney and Asserton followed closely the events in Turkestan. However, the most active was the work of professional intelligence officer general Malleson and military diplomats colonel Frederick Bailey and major Blacker.
On August 27, 1918, the Soviet consul in Kashgar Uspensky informed Domogatsky, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, that at the request of the British Consulate General, he had sighted passports of two British officers of the Indian army, colonel Bailey and major Blacker, their secretary Ifti-Khan Ahmet and four of Hindu servants, who travelled to Tashkent. According to Sir D. McCartney the British government was very concerned about the events taking place in the Caucasus and Central Asia along the borders with India. Moreover, in connection with the European war (First World War – M.D. and R.Z.), they sent the mentioned commission with informative purposes. As the politician persuaded, Colonel Bailey’s commission did not have any other purposes/ The members of the Commission explained their mission by the need to clarify the situation, to counteract the penetration of German agents into the territory of Afghanistan, Iran and India, and to investigate the cotton issue. The members of the mission did not have official diplomatic documents, confirming its official diplomatic nature.
Upon arrival in Turkestan, they established contact with the “Turkestan Union for the Struggle with Bolshevism”, the local national bourgeoisie and even with German and American intelligence agents. Another no less important and secret task was to identify the real forces among the local population, with the help of which it was possible to reverse the course of political events in favour of England. It was also necessary to respond appropriately and minimize pan-Islamic ideas in the anti-Bolshevik movement, which were detrimental for British administration
For that purpose, at the initial stage, through its emissaries the British Government attempted to provide material aid to the White Guards, Basmaches and the Emir.
Lloyd George admitted in his memoirs that England provided counter-revolutionary forces with all necessary things. He wrote, “We helped them with ammunition, all sorts of supplies and military advice on the part of our military missions” (as cited in On the Arrival in Tashkent of an English Mission Led by Bailey, 1963). In addition, the Entente countries and the United States tried to coordinate the Basmach actions with the operations of the troops of Kolchak, Denikin, Dutov and other counter-revolutionary forces. At the suggestion of Kolchak, the British mission had to allocate a 150 million roubles loan to Fergana’s Basmach bands and give them up to 16-18 field and mountain guns, 40 machine guns, 20 thousand grenades, 16 million rounds of ammunition. According to the plan of the Anglo-American imperialists, the Emir of Bukhara had to capture the part of the Central Asian railway (the Trans-Caspian Railway) that passed through the Emirate (Eleuova & Inoyatova, 1963).
However, the plans of England failed to be realised in CA. The reason stemmed from the fact that the initial efforts of escalating the anti-Bolshevik movement organised by foreign missions in CA came up against disagreements with the White Guards. The latter were categorically against the splitting Russia off into small states on its outskirts and they insisted on the protection of “intergraded and united Russia”. The controversy in political views stopped direct foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Turkestan. It led to the inconsistent actions of world powers in providing assistance to their “allies”" represented by the White Movement and the Emir in CA. This fact contradicts the rooted in the Soviet historiography opinion about the large-scale material assistance of interventionists to the White Guards and the Emir. On this issue, modern historical science and publicistic literature maintain that neither the White Movement nor the Emir of Bukhara received the expected military and material assistance from foreign companies. The received from the British support to all the fronts along the entire perimeter of Soviet Russia consisted of poor-quality weapons and military equipment (Kuprin, 1919).
Attempts of the British intelligence to collect statistical information on anti-Bolshevik forces in Turkestan also did not bring the expected results. Local informants, as a rule, the representatives of the Basmachi movement, did not always provide reliable information about the political thoughts of residents. For example, Kurbashi Shirmat, the leader of the basmachi, claimed that he had 76,000 followers in Fergana, 34,000 of them armed, and that he could collect 100,000 soldiers, if not for a shortage of weapons. The data collected by the British intelligence showed that the Basmachi movement had never been popular among the local population of CA. The information like that might become to be one of the reasons that the British ruling circles did not approve the intervention plan in Turkestan, and the reconnaissance mission of Colonel Bailey was stopped.
However, from the entire history, British politicians brought out irrefutable positive results, proceeding unexpectedly from a completely different angle. Their intelligence informed the government that in March 1918, a mission of eight people arrived from Tashkent to Kabul. The mission was headed by Mohamed Barakatullah, the leader of the Indian national liberation movement in the struggle with the British yoke in the East. On May 7, 1919, Barakatullah went from Tashkent, to Moscow where he talked to Lenin about the situation in the East and the possibilities of helping the liberation movement of Afghanistan.
The historian Gelshat Husainova in her article "Mohamed Barakatullah in Bashkortostan" gives the full text of the document that narrates the content of the conversation of the Indian professor with the head of Soviet Russia. Barakatullah suggested in dealing with the further fate of the Turkestan Republic that it should be granted the valid autonomy with equal representation of local Muslims and Russians in all power structures. In his opinion, the Turkestan Republic should have been divided into nine autonomous regions: Trans-Caspian, Samarqand, Sirdaryo, Fergana, Semirechye, Turgai, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Nizhny Ural (with the Bukey Horde).
Lenin asked Zeki Velidi Togan, the leader of the Bashkir national and liberation movement, prominent scholar-turkologist, who was in Moscow at that time, to express his attitude to the suggestions of M. Barakatullah. Zeki Velidi Togan not only supported the ideas of M. Barakatullah on the equal participation of Muslims and Russians in the representative and executive authorities of Turkestan, but also developed and complemented them, having raised the questions about the organisation of the army, the establishment of local population teaching, the development and interaction of regions, etc.
As a result, Lenin signed the directive of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (CC RCP (b)) to the regional party committee and the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Turkestan Republic, which was broadcast on July 12, 1919. That directive was about the necessity of the broad state activity participation of the local people according to the proportion of the population.
At once, everything was decided by itself in the interests of British political circles. In the reality, the Bolsheviks government embodied the desire of the British to see Russia divided into small parts of the outskirts of the Empire what the White Guards so resisted. That is why foreign representatives, first, the British ones, reacted calmly to the actions taken by the Soviet authorities in the province.
On September 5, 1918, the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan Soviet Republic declared: 1) to proclaim a partial mobilization of the Russian and Muslim population devoted to Soviet authorities; 2) to establish an Extraordinary Commission of Investigation to combat counter-revolution, speculation and marauding; 3) to protect the territory of Fergana from the Pamir by the military forces; 4) to concentrate cotton, wool, food, etc. in safe places stocks. On September 17, the Commissariat of National Affairs appealed to the workers of Turkestan with a petition to defend the Motherland from the English invaders. The formation of military groups from the local population began.
The liberation of Orenburg on January 22, 1919 and the restoration of the railway communication with Turkestan allowed Soviet Russia to deliver great material and military-technical aid to the Turkestan Republic. In March 1919, by decision of the government of the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics (RSFSR), all foreign consuls, as well as representatives of the American Red Cross and the “Young Men’s Christian Association” were expelled from Turkestan. Under those circumstances, in March 1919, the British command withdrew its troops from the Trans-Caspian region to Iran.
In October 1919, Lenin (1919) appealed to the workers and communists of Turkestan with a letter about the Commission of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars (CPC) of the RSFSR that was sent to Turkestan. The commission was established by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, dated October 8, 1919, consisting of Bokii, Goloshchyokin, Kuybyshev, Rudzutaks, Frunze and Eliava. Its main objectives were the strengthening of the union of the population of Turkestan with the working people of Soviet Russia, consolidation of the Soviet power, correction of mistakes, carrying out the national policy in Turkestan, and the establishment of party work. The members of the commission were charged with duty, guided by the decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars on October 8, 1919. It stated that “the self-determination of the Turkestan people and the destruction of all national inequality and the privileges of one national group over another constitute the basis of the whole policy of the Russian Soviet Government. The decree served as the guiding principle in the whole work of its parts. The members proclaimed that the mistrust of the indigenous working people of Turkestan, created by the long-term domination of Russian Tsarism, to the workers and peasants of Russia could finally be overcome by consolidated efforts” (Notes to the Complete Lenin Collected Works, 1919).
The letter was discussed by the participants in the joint meeting of the Regional Party Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan (CPT), the Regional Muslim Bureau of the CPT and the presidium of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee (TurkCEC). The discussion resulted in the adoption of the resolution, which stated, “We swear that we will execute all falling on us history tasks in accordance with the instructions of the Central Committee of our Party and the Third International”.
In those circumstances, even though England did not achieve the spreading out its colonial possessions at the expense of CA and failed create the “Turkestan Democratic Republic” under its control, it still received some benefits. Firstly, the intelligence obtained by Colonel Bailey’s mission was enough to understand there was no necessary force among the local population that, for material and military assistance, would render the necessary assistance to England in expanding its colonial possessions in CA. On the contrary, it was obvious that people sympathized the Soviet authorities in greater degree. Secondly, the propaganda activities of the British intelligence stirred and destabilized the political situation in CA. The civil war, which eventually moved the alleged centre of pan-Islamic resistance from India, widely spread in CA. The Basmachi movement that relied on a religious call to
The foregoing gives us the right to depart from the existed in the Soviet historical literature stereotype of the complete failure of the British intelligence intrigues in CA. England, once again having gained nothing in CA, remained with its interests, preserving its colonial jewel, India.
As for Afghanistan, it should be noted that the subsequent overthrow of Emir Mohammed Alim Khan from the throne of Bukhara on September 2, 1920 and his flight to Afghanistan deteriorated relations between the RSFSR and the newly formed Bukharan People's Soviet Republic with its southern neighbour. Therefore, on September 21, 1920, the government of the RSFSR addressed the note to the Afghan Foreign Minister, Mahmud Tarzi. The government of the RSFSR, citing the anti-Soviet actions of the government of Afghanistan, called for mutual understanding and good-neighbourly relations. The note denounced the actual ambition of Afghanistan to expand its territory at the expense of the possessions of the Emir of Bukhara, especially its eastern part.
Because of the complexity of the foreign policy and the civil war in CA Soviet government had to govern Eastern Bukhara from January 1922 to 1924 through the Extraordinary Dictatorship Commission. It was created by the BukhCEC (Central Executive Committee) and provided unlimited military and civil power and possessed the rights of the Supreme Court. However, the consolidation of Soviet power created conditions for the national-state delimitation of the peoples of CA.
On October 27, 1924, the 2nd session of the second assembly of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, after hearing a report on the resolutions of the supreme authorities of the Central Asian republics and the RSFSR, gave the power of state law to the decisions. Because of the national-state delimitation of the territories of the Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm republics, the Uzbek SSR and the Turkmen SSR, the Tajik ASSR in the Uzbek SSR, the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast as a part of the RSFSR were formed in 1924-1925. At first Kara-kalpak Autonomous Oblast was a part of the Kirghiz one, and then it was transferred to the direct subordination of the RSFSR. The regions of the Turkestan ASSR, populated by Kazakhs, entered the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
All through the ongoing external threat, national-territorial demarcation of the CA was carried out by forced methods, as well as all subsequent procedures taken by the Soviet leadership in order to build socialism in the USSR. Despite the fact that Lenin strongly recommended to entrust compiling the ethnographic map of Turkestan (unfortunately, it was not specified – M.D. and R.Z.), it was never prepared on time. Consequently, the national-territorial demarcation of the CA was organised “clumsily” and “roughly”. As a result, the Tajik ASSR was actually dislodged from the pan-Turkists represented by A. Rakhimbaev, the Secretary of the Turkestan Central Committee. Then the problem of the national self-determination of the Tajiks was raised several times at the governmental level, and only in 1929, the Tajik ASSR was changed into the Tajik SSR.
Thus, after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia, the foreign policy situation was, if not the main, but still one of the decisive factors for accelerating the national-territorial demarcation in CA, after which the political map of the world changed. In its outlines, the region of CA was represented by new state formations. Even though at first glance it seemed that the USSR, formed on the territory of the former tsarist empire, became defenceless at its southern borders, in reality everything was vice versa. Against the background of the active national self-consciousness rise of the European countries, the ideas of national unity and national-territorial separation were getting into CA. It helped the peoples of CA to mobilize against the Basmachi movement and show the international community their readiness to fight for the independence. The peoples of CA as a part of the USSR, the unified state, could ensure political stability in the region and lay the foundations for a strong economy. They overcame the tragic years of the Great Patriotic War and the post-war reconstruction of the national economy, and then they withstood the collapse of the Soviet Union. Through this challenging field of endeavour, the peoples of CA, including Tajiks, managed to bring the era of renaissance and the establishment of their national state formations.
The process was, obviously, quite long and complicated, but already in the first years of building a new life, the republics achieved serious success. All the participants in the political game, who fought for CA at the beginning of the 20th century, accepted that fact. Moreover, today they admit the independence of the modern states of CA.
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Sociolinguistics, linguistics, semantics, discourse analysis, science, technology, society
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Dzhamalova*, M., & Rakhmtova, Z. (2020). The Foreign Policy Factor Of National-Territorial Demarcation In Central Asia. In D. Karim-Sultanovich Bataev, S. Aidievich Gapurov, A. Dogievich Osmaev, V. Khumaidovich Akaev, L. Musaevna Idigova, M. Rukmanovich Ovhadov, A. Ruslanovich Salgiriev, & M. Muslamovna Betilmerzaeva (Eds.), Social and Cultural Transformations in the Context of Modern Globalism, vol 76. European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences (pp. 3630-3640). Future Academy. https://doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2019.12.04.488