Panel A |
Variables |
Observations |
Mean |
Std. Dev. |
Min |
Max |
Directors, Remuneration (RM’) |
100 |
12,888,342 |
23,786,187 |
63,000 |
156,400,000 |
CEO shareholdings (%) |
100 |
4.96309 |
13.45788 |
0 |
68.5 |
Board Independence |
100 |
.4669375 |
.1022057 |
.3 |
.75 |
Family Ownership (%) |
100 |
6.03834 |
14.91121 |
0 |
68.5 |
Direct Shareholdings of D Directors |
100 |
2.17543 |
7.71394 |
0 |
57 |
Indirect Shareholdings of Directors |
100 |
6.95704 |
15.7892 |
0 |
68.5 |
Return on Assets |
100 |
.093924 |
.0986136 |
-.1042 |
.6959 |
Firm size (Total assets) (RM) |
100 |
11,132,632.85 |
17,193,765.9329 |
139,777 |
110,650,200 |
Debt Ratio |
100 |
24.46997 |
17.07878 |
0 |
63.01888 |
Growth Opportunities |
100 |
3.9327 |
7.204319 |
.46 |
56.2 |
Panel B |
Variables |
Observations |
Dummy = 1 |
Dummy = 0 |
|
|
Derivatives Usage |
100 |
56 |
44 |
|
|
Audit Quality (1= Big4) |
100 |
90 |
10 |
|
|
Presence of Female Directors |
100 |
67 |
33 |
|
|