The article covers the problem of moral freedom, as well as its connections with the concepts of logical and natural necessity. The research is based on the ideas of German classical philosophers: I. Kant’s teaching about free causality, I. Fichte’s teaching about the supreme goal of all intelligent beings, A. Schopenhauer’s teaching about will as a non-reasoned thing and G. Hegel’s teaching about freedom as a cognized necessity. The research covers voluntarism basics, as well as analyzes two types of causality (natural and free ones) and two corresponding forms of the law of the sufficient reason. The research arrives at the following conclusions: 1) Moral evil is not about real actions, but about the inconsistency of its appraisal and goals set behind it. This applies both to those who do evil and those third parties who appraise it. 2) The logical law of contradiction and identity is a general principle of any goal-setting, and hence the general principle of free causality and moral necessity. 3) Natural necessity differs from moral necessity only in the formal distinction of cause and consequence. The content of the cause and effect is identical, which determine all kinds of necessity. Keywords: moral, freedom, necessity, causality, voluntarism, law of contradiction and identity, law of sufficient reason.
Keywords: Causalityfreedomlaw of contradiction and identitylaw of sufficient reason moralnecessity
The explores the problem of moral freedom, as well as its connection with the concepts of logical and natural necessity. The most profound philosophical research in this sphere so far were carried out by German classical philosophers (G. Leibniz, I. Kant, I. Fichte, G. Hegel, A. Schopenhauer, etc.). Their teaching of moral liberty and necessity, on the one hand, is very different from those prevailing in 20th century philosophy. “Morality is a science based on logical evidence”, Leibniz (1982, p. 90) considered. These days, it's hard to hear it anywhere (Sokolova, Pylkin, Safanova, & Stroganova, 2017; Serkova, Pylkin, Safonova, & Savitskaya, 2017; Shipunova, Berezovskaya, Gashkova, & Ivanova, 2017; Pozdeeva, Trostinskaya, Evseeva, & Ivanova, 2017; Bylieva, Lobatyuk, & Rubtsova, 2018). On the other hand, it was the German classical philosophy that gave birth to
The relevance of the problem is due to the deep moral crisis of modern society caused by popular postmodern irrationalism in moral issues, i.e. a complete loss of faith in provable and universally valid moral values, which indicates the clear concept about the relations between
The research covers voluntarism basics, as well as analyzes two types of causality (natural and free ones) and two corresponding forms of the law of the sufficient reason.
Purpose of the Study
To reveal the connection between the concepts of moral freedom and logical as well as natural necessity.
Arisotle's formal logic and Kant's transcendental method.
Voluntarism as a doctrine that takes the
Consideration 1. If we review the term ‘will’ in its most common sense, it means ability to “<...> start or not start <...> various actions <...> by the choice of our spirit <...>. This power is called will (volonté)” (Leibniz, 1982, p. 172). To this extent, will is essentially
However, in this regard, Kant (1998) also believed that
Thus, it proves that
Consideration 2. We can assume that “<…> all actions of intelligent beings <…> are subject to natural necessity; however, these actions are free as related to a reasonable subject and its ability to act based on its reason alone” (Kant, 1996, p. 226). I. Kant presumed that practical grounding of an action act is always based on a willed decision.
“The groundlessness of will <…> was recognized where it is most evident, as the will of man, and the latter was called free <…>. However, <…> due to the groundlessness of will, the necessity, on which will manifestations are always dependent, was overlooked, and actions were declared free, which they cannot be,” A. Schopenhauer wrote, “as every single action follows from the motive influence with the strictest necessity. <…> From this comes the amazing fact that everyone a priori considers themselves quite free <…>. But a posteriori, based on their experience, they finds to their surprise that they is not free, but is dependent on the need” (Schopenhauer, 1992, p. 42).
Schopenhauer (1992, p. 41) arrives at the following conclusion:
Problem 1. If there is at least one thing (will), free from the form of the law of causation, we should admit the latter
The optimal solution to the problem was given by Kant (1998, p. 294) who specified “<…> two kinds of causality in relation to what is happening:
The approving (natural) effect of this principle is that the real content of the subject must be also caused by something else. Therefore,
the natural causalitydenotes “<…> the connection of one state <…> with another preceding state, which the former follows by the rule” (Kant, 1998, p. 294).
The denying (reverse) effect of the same principle is that every object with no external cause has no real content. This relates to
free causation,i.e. to will, as will as a thing-in-itself has no predetermined real content, according to its concept.
In the latter case, it can have no external reason as well, due to
On the other hand, Heidegger (1999, p. 25-26) is also right, considering “<...> the provision of reason <...> as the one that can have no exceptions <...>”. “We have distinguished between the denying and approving forms <...> of the provision of reason,” M. Heidegger teaches, making it clear that everything free from the approving form of this principle is subject to
Problem 2. Based on the principle of identity, any
However, we have already found out that freedom is nothing more than a lack of definedness, i.e. nothing, while any
“Any defined knowledge,” Fichte (1993, p. 630) writes, “embraces this double nature: freedom in general, which thereby is the
But if, in this way, all foundations of science are arbitrary, then what is the distinction between science and art and what is there any point, for example, in logic with its search for necessary and generally valid rules. The optimal solution to this problem was proposed by I. Fichte who managed to derive the definition of a necessary universal higher goal from the very concept of freedom.
Therefore, the latter is
Hence it is clear that freedom and necessity cannot contradict each other. Indeed, their essence is based on the same logical principle of the object identity to itself, i.e. to its definition:
Therefore, even in the case when object
The latter, according to I. Fichte, leads to the fact that whenever
Fichte (1993) arrived at the following conclusion: “Everything, to which the provision
But if the provision
That means that the very concept of freedom defines
Thus, it is emphasized that the
Thus, if this principle was earlier understood only as a manifestation of the purpose of learning and logical proof, now it appears to us as a principle of
This means that “the ultimate human aspiration <…> is the aspiration for identity, for full harmony with themselves,” Fichte (1993) concludes, “and that they could always be in harmony with themselves, to agree everything that is outside them with their <…> notions thereabout. Their notions
Accordingly, if someone’s moral contains
“Moral evil,” Kant (1999, p. 232) claimed, “has a characteristics inseparable from its nature, that it is <...> self-destructive and self-contradictory according to its purpose”. The question is: how then are illogical and contradictory goals possible, if the logical law of contradiction
In fact, if
That is what defines contradictory goal. However, this contradiction is clearly inherent
“This is a standpoint of non-freedom and at the same time is a source of discontent,” Hegel (1975) notes, “On the contrary, when a person admits that what is happening to them is only the evolution of themselves and that he bears only their own guilt, they treats everything as a free human and retains the belief that they does not experience injustice in all circumstances of their life” (p. 326). This means that freedom is a
So, if cognized logical necessity of choice makes it
Moral evil is not about real actions, but about the inconsistency of its appraisal and goals set behind it. This applies both to those who do evil and those third parties who appraise it.
The logical law of contradiction and identity is a general principle of any goal-setting, and hence the general principle of free causality and moral necessity.
Natural necessity differs from moral necessity only in the formal distinction of cause and consequence. The content of the cause and effect is identical, which determine all kinds of necessity.
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Zamorev, A. (2018). On Moral Freedom And Necessity. In V. Chernyavskaya, & H. Kuße (Eds.), Professional Сulture of the Specialist of the Future, vol 51. European Proceedings of Social and Behavioural Sciences (pp. 1646-1653). Future Academy. https://doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2018.12.02.176