

**NININS 2020****International Scientific Forum «National Interest, National Identity and National Security»****HISTORICAL MEMORY AS A STABILITY FACTOR OF THE  
RUSSIAN STATE AND SOCIETY**

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**Abstract**

The given scientific paper provides a thorough and deep analytical consideration of the conceptual content of the term “historical memory” in the context of the highly topical problem of ensuring the stability as well as the security of the Russian state and society. The authors of the scientific article under consideration have put forward and substantiated the thesis that the formula “Spirituality as the values of the Orthodox Christianity and other traditional religions of Eurasia, Sovereignness as the country’s independent statehood, Dignity as the respect for the human person, family and State” could be used to attempt to provide a lasting synthesis between the existing traditionalist and liberal value orientations in the formation of historical consciousness and historical memory of our fellow citizens, which would undoubtedly help to consolidate them, strengthen and unite the Russian state and the promotion and development of civil society, ensuring the spiritual and moral security of the country.

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*Keywords:* Civil society, historical memory, historical consciousness, spiritual and moral security, the Russian state and society



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## 1. Introduction

The category “historical memory” is by its nature an area of interdisciplinary research (Savrutskaya & Ustinkin, 2019), its essence and content, role and significance in the political process of Russia, ensuring national security are the subject of debate.

From the point of view of history, “historical memory” is a collection of historical messages, myths, subjectively broken reflections about positive and negative events of the past transmitted from generation to generation. Historical memory is heterogeneous in its structure and includes the historical memory of the individual, individual social groups, society as a whole. Historical memory, as a rule, is limited; it captures only individual events, people, facts. It is selective, i.e. focuses on some events and processes and ignores others, is subjective and unsystematic. By virtue of these properties, memory contributes to the mythologization of social consciousness. Sometimes, a certain combination of unfavourable objective and subjective factors, such as socio-political and spiritual and moral division of society, unrest and the absence of the national leader and the political will of the elite is its disorganization, creating fertile ground for all sorts of ideological and political speculations.

In philosophy and political science, historical memory is considered to be one of the dimensions of collective or social memory, along with political time and political space. Memory is defined as the ability of an organism, a subject of politics, a system to save and reproduce information about the external world (environment) and its internal state for its further use in the process of human life, society and the state.

In sociology, despite the existence of different approaches to the phenomenon under consideration, the central memory problem was considered the ability of the system to accumulate, process, store and transmit social and culturally significant information necessary for the functioning of society. From this point of view, the sociocultural experience of mankind is recorded in the historical memory of peoples with the help of cultural codes, as means and mechanisms of social inheritance, which include in their structure language, art, ideology, religion and other sign systems, as well as the whole diversity of the subject-material environment, material and spiritual culture, as well as traditions, customs, rituals, holidays, norms of behaviour.

Cultural codes, as information about the past, present and future of societies reflected in a certain form through a system of symbols and signs, helps identify the meanings and meanings of the collective or individual “I”, with a complex of similar signs of the “other”. Cultural codes have played and are playing a special role in streamlining social processes and preserving the integrity and general cultural uniqueness of Russian and other societies. Cultural codes, ensuring the adequacy of verbal and non-verbal systems of historical and cultural traditions and established norms of relations, keep in memory of history the national and cultural identity of peoples and are the most important characteristics of ethnocultural identity. Cultural codes transmit the corresponding understanding of symbols and images of national cultures to new generations, being the most important mechanism of spiritual continuity, ethnocultural identity and a condition for maintaining the integrity of societies.

In this context, historical memory, as an important component of the cultural and historical code of a nation, is called upon to fulfil a consolidating, uniting the Russian society function, playing the role of a value guide for various social groups.

We share the approach in which historical consciousness and historical memory are considered as one of the phenomena of sociocultural regulation of the behavior of individuals and collectives, social groups, strata and classes, ethnic groups and society as a whole. The power that effectively carries out such regulation ensures the normal functioning of society and its reproduction. Power, unable to cope with the solution of this problem, plunges society and the state into chaos, giving way to the counter-elite.

In the structure of historical consciousness and social memory, it is fundamentally important to evaluate and normative-value content, in which there are three elements:

- a shared system of values and symbols;
- the individual's awareness of his "I" in the family and estate genealogy; understanding of "we" in the social and confessional environment, the cultural community of the region, country, human civilization;
- historical experience passing from generation to generation, knowledge, symbols, ideas, beliefs included in historical memory.

Thus, historical memory is focused in a certain way consciousness which reflects the particular importance and relevance of the information about the past, in close connection with the present and future, and in this way is an important part of social and cultural self-control mechanism of society (homeostasis).

Historical consciousness can be interpreted as a national identity, i.e. given by the national vision of the world and national history, the basic idea that society lives in a specific historical era and, therefore, acceptable to the majority. Identity is the answer to the question of the essence of one's people, its place, role and tasks in world history, and the ideal forms of its existence. In a globalized struggle for identity – the main front – consensual war (Rudakov & Ustinkin, 2018), the essence of which is a new stage in the struggle – competition of forms of organization of consciousness, where certain types of consciousness are the subject of defeat and destruction. The carriers of these consciousnesses, on the contrary, can be preserved if they abandon the traditional forms of consciousness. Moreover, it is important to understand that the destruction of certain types of consciousness, historical memory, involves the destruction and reorganization of states and communities that constitute this type of consciousness (Rudakov & Ustinkin, 2017).

The socio-political split of the Russian society that has not yet been overcome, the influence and internal attempts to undermine the all-Russian identity, the painful search for the civilizational foundations of our country, its essential dimensions and values, represent a serious socio-political, spiritual, moral, cultural and legal problem for the authorities (Rudakov & Ustinkin, 2016). For an integral criterion for the survival and self-regulation of society is the trust between the government and society, the main subjects of the political process. The knowledge that fosters an understanding of the intersubjective meaning of social interactions is reflected in expectations in the form of generalized trust. Generalized trust, according to Tenenbaum and Simmel, is a kind of world outlook, reflecting the willingness of people to consider others, based on the expectations of their reliability and predictability. If

the representations of social groups about various objects of social reality do not coincide with expectations in the course of the political process, then generalized trust goes into a state of distrust, losing its normative role. The dialectic of the relationship of trust and mistrust is revealed in the mutual transitions of one state to another as a reaction to a change in expectations from the subject of interactions. As a rule, people's expectations of the authorities. Disappointment in hopes contributes to the rapid growth of contradictions in society, under adverse conditions, growing into tension and crisis.

What political and spiritual moral values are preached by the political and spiritual leaders of Russia? What place do they occupy in the historical memory of our fellow citizens? How satisfied are they with the current socio-economic system and the political regime of the Russian Federation? What values can unite our concurrently split society?

The liberal, traditionalist and centrist creeds of the relevant parts of the current elite of Russia are well and thoroughly reflected in the world historiography. Less well-known is the position on this issue of President Putin and the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Kirill. The views of the political and spiritual leaders of the country traditionally seriously affect the historical and social consciousness of our fellow citizens. In addition, both the President and the patriarch enjoy well-deserved authority and trust among our fellow citizens. What do they preach?

Putin has repeatedly stated that he considers Russia a country – a civilization, the main national idea of which should be patriotism. Russia, from the point of view of the President, has its sovereignty, a set of values; its laws of social development; its model of society and the state; its system of historical and spiritual coordinates.

Patriarch Kirill believes that Russia brings to the world the experience of building fair and peaceful inter-ethnic and religious relations; the experience of multi-polar and multi-layered being; a tradition of self-restraint, so important in an environment of resource scarcity and environmental crisis; the concept of spiritual sovereignty and Orthodox values, which are the basis of a nationwide identity; the idea of human solidarity as a special national idea that permeates our history and culture.

In our opinion, these concepts mutually enrich and complement each other.

What is the historical and social self-awareness of our fellow citizens today, formed in the context of political, ideological, cultural and moral pluralism? How are the above-described ideas and social transformations reflected in the historical memory of Russians?

The Federal Scientific Research Sociological Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Director Academician Gorshkov) has long and fruitfully studied these problems (Gorshkova et al., 2011).

Without affecting all aspects of the post-Soviet transformation in the mass consciousness of Russians, we will focus on the events of the 20th century, because it is under their influence that, first of all, the self-awareness of our fellow citizens is formed. Of course, of particular importance is the assessment of the 1917 revolution and the subsequent civil war, the Great Patriotic War and the events associated with the transformation of the political system of Russia after 1991.

For the current generation of Russians, as shown by the results of monitoring by the Federal Scientific and Technical Center of RAS, the revolution and the ensuing civil war is a story the attitude to which is very vague and controversial. So, the question of what the revolution brought more to the

country – benefit or harm – 32 % of the respondents found it difficult to answer, approximately the same number – 29 % – chose the “streamlined” answer: “the benefits and harm are approximately equal.” Those who have a clear opinion about these events were divided almost in half: 21 % believed that “better”, and 19 % that “more harm”.

Thus, the criticism of October, which was very active in the 1990s, shook the confidence of most Russians in the positive significance of the Bolshevik experiment for Russia. At the same time, a significant part of our fellow citizens is not inclined to paint the events of 1917–1922 “exclusively in black colors ...”. Conditionally “liberal” and “communist” interpretations do not dominate in the modern consciousness of Russian society (19 % versus 21 %). The “blurred” estimates (not determined, see the “pluses” and “minuses” – 61 %) of the majority of Russians can be explained by the lack of an unequivocal position of the authorities regarding the revolution of 1917 in the year of its centenary, and the consequence of the departure of once-relevant historical events on the periphery of public attention amid new challenges and threats to the country in recent years. But a significant part of Russians is accustomed to relying on the opinion of the country's leadership. The calls for the “mutual forgiveness of white and red” of Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill, the head of the Izborsk Club, the editor-in-chief of the *Zavtra* newspaper Prokhanov, and the Communist Party leader Zyuganov and many others about the combination of values with a strong, nationally meaningful statehood («white idea») with the values of social justice («red idea») played their role. From their point of view, only on this basis will Russia gain coveted social harmony and sovereign power (Danichev, 2017; Zyuganov, 1999).

Thus, the trend towards reconciliation is reflected very clearly in the public mind. However, the palette of assessments of the impact of the revolution and the civil war on the life of the country, the trajectory of its development, remains very wide today: from complete “justification” (Tretyakov, 2017) to the complete “denial” of any positive role (Tsipko, 2020).

Among the specialists of historians, political scientists and sociologists, an understanding of the unity of the opposing forces, their interdependence and mutual influence in determining the vector of socio-economic and political development of Russia are being affirmed. The current Russian authorities support the policy of reducing passions and ideological confrontation over the Russian revolution and the events that followed.

The rule of “three generations” helps to solve this problem, the essence of which is that agreement and reconciliation between former enemies and their ancestors is achieved after three generations after revolutions and civil wars. Grave malice and hatred of ideological and class enemies are gradually disappearing into the past, only its foci and relapses remain. However, most of the population is afraid of the possibility of a recurrence of revolutionary cataclysms. Another factor working for the reconciliation trend was the growing interest of our fellow citizens in the history of their families. According to Yudin and Khlevnyuk (2018), this leads to the emergence of a two-layer structure of historical memory, formed by the state and personality-family, arising from below, spontaneously. It is becoming fashionable to know and remember the story of your family; not knowing is indecent.

From the point of view of the above-mentioned authors, through many individual stories, mutual recognition between those whom the events of the past divorced on different sides of the barricades

becomes possible. Since "living memory does not seek enemies, does not depreciate someone else's historical experience and cannot be used for political purposes."

Hirsch, Barash consider this phenomenon through the phenomenon of "post-memory"; providing an emotional connection with the past. Post-memory "creates" the past through the "thematization of landmark events of history", i.e., the revival of memorial constructs and their inclusion in family myths and traditions, as well as in the collective memory of social groups.

In our opinion, the surge in the Russian interest in the Russian and personal history should not be overestimated. The level of awareness of our fellow citizens about the fate of their ancestors in the tragic periods of national history today can be interpreted as a real "memory gap" (Gorshkova, 2017). This is due to the fact that in the conditions of social transformations of the first years of the Soviet power, many peasants, leaving for five-year construction projects and working in cities, did not consider it necessary or did not know how to preserve the memory of their ancestors. In addition, many were forced to hide their genealogy until 1991: dispossessed, dissipated, repressed, alien social elements and other "enemies of the people"; family members of counterrevolutionaries who were held captive and had relatives abroad, etc.

At the same time, the revolution, having destroyed the old organization of life in Russia, made it possible for the lower strata of society to get education, to realize themselves in different spheres and areas of life, to come to power. It would seem that most Russians should remember this. However, 40 % of the respondents of the research at the Federal Scientific Research Center for Science and Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences found it difficult to answer the question: "Have your families won as a result of the arrival of the Bolsheviks?" As for the "winners" and "losers," their number turned out to be almost equal: 32 % of respondents believe that the revolution gave their ancestors "vertical mobility"; 29 %, on the contrary, believe that they were not able to fully realize themselves under the Soviet regime, and in other circumstances, they would have achieved more.

There are more "winners" among the older generation. Young people – 57 % – do not know anything about their ancestors. As for the material factor, well-off Russians more often note the gain of their ancestors from the coming to power of the Bolsheviks, i.e. a significant part of our society, who lived well in Soviet times, successfully adapted to today's realities. The change of the system in 1991 in its consequences, as we see, is markedly different from the events of 1917–1922.

The phenomenon of "memory gap" was even more clearly manifested in answers to the question about the specific circumstances of the life of ancestors in the civil war:

- Most of the current generation of Russians (60 %) knows nothing about what their relatives did and what position they occupied in 1917–1922;
- 25 % of respondents know that their ancestors supported the "red";
- 24 % remember that their ancestors suffered from repression;
- -13 % suffered from terror in the civil war;
- 6 % remember their ancestors with weapons in their hands who rebelled against the Bolsheviks.

The contradictory picture is caused not only by a lack of reliable information but also by the fact that a modern resident of the Russian Federation may have relatives – supporters of the "Reds", as well as losers from the advent of the Soviet regime. If in the 20s mainly the former counter-revolutionaries and

their families were repressed, then in the 30s, those who established and supported the Soviet government dominated. Slightly more informed are those whose ancestors suffered from the Soviet regime, which is associated with the rather active work of the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repressions "in the center and the localities" (Gorshkova & Petuhov, 2018).

Thus, neither the elite nor society has an unambiguous position concerning the revolution and the subsequent civil war, which is associated with the phenomenon of "post-memory", a split in value orientations, and a two-layer structure of the contemporary historical consciousness of Russians. It seems that our society and the state are currently in the historical antiphase of 1917. Then revolutionary sentiment swept over most of society. Today a minority wants a revolution. Then the revolutionary extremist demolition of social traditions took place. Today, conservative traditionalist values triumph and strengthen (Ustinkin, 2018).

- 47 % of respondents perceive the "revolution" with a negative connotation;
- 28 % believe that reforms should begin with the economy, not the political system;
- 22 % of respondents argue that "life cannot be changed by the method of a revolution; gradual transformation is necessary";
- 21 % that you can't live without faith in God.

Moreover, most of our fellow citizens do not believe in the likelihood of catastrophic scenarios for Russia: today, only 11 % and 9 % consider the revolutionary change of power and civil war quite probable; unlikely 36 % and 27 %, respectively, and almost unrealistic 53 % and 64 % of Russians surveyed.

Consequently, the confrontation between the "red" and "white" is not the main factor in the insurmountable split of Russian society today. The history of the revolution and civil war, in comparison with 1990, has practically no effect on the formation of the "agenda" of modern socio-political Russia (Gorshkova & Petuhov, 2018).

This thesis is confirmed by the table below (Table 01):

**Table 1.** The ratio of Russians to some events of the XX century in Russia, % (Gorshkova & Petuhov, 2018)

Answer options	Definitely positive	Rather positive	Rather negative	Definitely negative	Difficult to answer
The overthrow of the monarchy	8	20	25	thirteen	34
The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks	7	23	23	12	34
A radical transition to a market economy	4	19	26	20	30
Liquidation of the system of councils, execution of the Supreme Council in 1993	3	8	27	25	38

If in the estimates of the October events in 1917, our citizens are divided almost equally, the attitude to the overthrow of the monarchy is more negative (28 % of supporters against 28 % of opponents). Another critical attitude towards the radical period of 1991–1992 (Yeltsin-Gaidar reforms) is 23 % against 46 % and the execution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation in 1993 (11 %

“for”, “against” – 52 %). As you can see, the attempts to paint the history of the Soviet period in one color were unsuccessful. The public opinion of the Russians is uniquely positively related to periods of stability, the strengthening of the state, and negatively to all periods of revolutionary changes.

According to the data obtained in the course of IS RAS polls, 15 % of respondents believe that the 20th century gave Russia more than any other. Almost the same – 13 % say that it was the most difficult century of Russian history. 2/3 of respondents combine these extreme assessments, believing that the 20th century will go down in the history of Russia as a time of great accomplishments and, at the same time, losses not seen before (Gorshkov, 2016). First of all, this refers to the assessment of the course and outcome of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945: from 62 % to 81 % of respondents consider the victory of the Soviet people in this war the greatest event in the Soviet history of the twentieth century (Gorshkov, 2016), however, they evaluate these events, as it has already been said, in a diametrically opposite way. Such a split in the historical consciousness of our fellow citizens could not but be reflected in historiography.

What is the situation with the perception by students of the events of the Great Patriotic War in practice?

Data from several sociological studies conducted in 2000–2016 in the Russian Federation testify that a rational-critical position is more accurate, closer to the truth. That there is no catastrophe in the historical consciousness of students, their value orientations.

Let us single out several fundamentally important points proving, in our opinion, this point of view. Why do we cite sociological research data on the following questions: do young people feel interested in the events of the Great Patriotic War and how do they interpret them? What sources does it receive information from? What, from the point of view of youth, are the sources of the victory of the USSR in these years?

The results of sociological studies indicate that the Great Patriotic War still arouses interest among students as the main event of the twentieth century in the history of Russia.

65 % of respondents are convinced that the feat of the older generations, their dedication and love for the motherland will continue to be an example for future generations (Saraliev et al., 2015). Young people profess quite conservative spiritual and moral values. Going to live and work in Russia (70 %); get a quality education, create a family. Lead a healthy lifestyle (80 %). 80 % of respondents are interested in the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. The military theme emerges in informal interpersonal communication of people (70 %). Such all-Russian patriotic actions as “Immortal Regiment” and the intensified search movement “Nobody is Forgotten and Nothing is Forgotten” sharply spurred interest in history. Most families in which relatives fought have some form of memory of those terrible heroic days. Our youth, unlike the French, German and many other European countries, believes that one of the main tasks of Russian politicians is to create a strong state (75 %). And that it is exactly this state that is capable of protecting the national interests of the country, solving the problems of socio-economic development of Russia (60 %) (Savrutskaya, 2014).

However, it is alarming that some students (18 %) do not have a clear, unambiguous position on this issue; (17 %) of respondents noted that over the years, the memory of the war is obscured by other



more modern events and problems. 7 % – believes that the heroism and self-sacrifice of the participants of the Great Patriotic War are not clear to a significant part of the youth (Saraliev et al., 2015).

What sources of information affect the consciousness of students? The range of such sources is wide and diverse, they differ in their goals and objectives, reliability and credibility.

Education is still the main source of knowledge about the Great Patriotic War (82–86 %). However, it is no longer possible to hope that the educational system provides the necessary minimum of knowledge to students. The time for studying this period of Russian history is steadily decreasing. As a result, young people self-critically evaluate their knowledge of the war. Only 9 % of the respondents consider the available knowledge sufficient. 23 % of respondents, recognizing the lack of knowledge, are convinced that they no longer need it (Saraliev et al., 2015).

In general, the awareness of students is disappointing. The weakest link in terms of awareness in the survey contingent are students of vocational schools, technical schools and other secondary special educational institutions.

Only by the number of books read and films watched about the war, they stand next to their peers from 11 general education classes, which in turn are on the same level as university students, and are ahead of them some positions.

The lack of knowledge about the events of those years among students is exacerbated by the fact that a significant part of young people fills them up due to an uncritical perception of information from the Internet and modern films. (75 %) At the same time, according to a study conducted in the Nizhny Novgorod region, the hierarchy of sources of knowledge about the Great Patriotic War (level of trust in them) among students is as follows:

1. School books;
2. Teachers;
3. Soviet feature films;
4. Stories of relatives;
5. Soviet documentaries;
6. Contemporary feature films;
7. Meetings with veterans;
8. Fiction;
9. Modern documentaries;
10. University professors;
11. Forums on the Internet;
12. Scientific research;
13. Talk shows on TV;
14. Memoirs of generals.

As you can see, the influence of the Internet and modern feature films on students is exaggerated by some researchers. It seems that university teachers should intensify their work on the military-patriotic education of youth. Pupils (80 %) need information about the war from its immediate participants and their near and dear ones (Saraliev et al., 2015).

One of the indicators of the unity and continuity of the historical consciousness of different generations is the idea of how the USSR managed to defeat Hitler Germany and its allies.

Estimates of the significance of the factors of the Great Victory by three generations of citizens of the Russian Federation according to some studies are as follows:

1. Patriotism and heroism of the Soviet people;
2. The military art of the Soviet commanders;
3. The unity of the party and the people;
4. Geographic – climatic conditions of the USSR;
5. The superiority of the Soviet military equipment;
6. The leading role of VKPB (All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks);
7. Support for the power of the Russian Orthodox Church;
8. The genius of Stalin;
9. The help of the allies;
10. God's will.

A complete coincidence of the estimates of generations was caused by the factor of patriotism and heroism of the Soviet people. Almost 100 % of the representatives of young, middle and older respondents cited this factor as the most important and determining.

The vast majority of contemporaries of different ages are proud of the commanders who ensured the victory. The younger generation differs markedly from the older in assessing the leading and guiding role of the CPSU as a factor in victory. Today, the activities of the communists during the war are practically not covered in the media.

36 % of youth (1/3) completely agree with the statement “the communists were the first to attack, the last to leave the battle”, 23 % of young people consider this proposition "propaganda." Most young people found it difficult to answer this question (2/3). At this point, youth is the main victim of misinformation and manipulation of historical consciousness.

Among the older generation, 45–65 % of respondents believe that the USSR won thanks to the genius of Stalin. This view is shared by a much smaller number of young respondents (1/4) – 10 %. In general, young people, compared with the older generation, are less sympathetic to the mobilization and egalitarian tendencies and repressions for all periods of Russian history. Strongly condemn Stalin's repressions (37 %) (Saraliev et al., 2015).

The main conclusion of sociological research 2000–2016 in the Russian Federation is that the historical identity of the Russians during the Great Patriotic War no longer reveals the tendency to the fragmentation that was characteristic of the situation of ideological and political split in the Russian society in the early 1990s. On some key issues between generations of Russians, there is not only positive but also negative consensus. 62 % of our fellow citizens agreed on an assessment of the tragic character of the Second World War.

Comparing the identified assessments of the events of the Second World War, we can conclude that our fellow citizens attach importance not only to objective indicators characterizing the course and outcome of the war but also to the moral and psychological state of society. The indisputable significance of the great victory in the Great Patriotic War is perceived not only as a kind of “result” but also as a moment of moral consolidation of the nation.

A very interesting portrait in the historical self-consciousness of the Russians was formed in the assessment of the USSR under Stalin. Here, when highlighting the distinctive positive characteristics of a society, discipline and order, love for the Fatherland and the presence of ideals, rapid economic development and powerful industry, the country's successes in the development of technology, science, education, the inherent sense of pride in people, the authority of the USSR in the world community are indicated.

Among the negative judgments – the definitions of the USSR under I.V. Stalin, only two stand out: fear and political repression. Almost with hollow unanimity, the Russians reject the nihilistic point of view that Russia will never succeed (it is shared by only 4 %).

For some years most Russians support and consistently use the idea of the unity of the peoples of Russia with a view to its revival as a great power (42 %). In the second place in terms of rating is the idea of creating a state of the law in Russia (38 %). Other variants of the national idea and state-building, including a return to socialism, the adoption of the principles of liberalism and liberal democracy were significant for 7–21 % of respondents (Gorshkov, 2016).

Thus, the common historical memory, the emerging consensus in ideas about the main lessons that Russia should learn from the historical experience of the twentieth century is the most important factor in the stability and sustainability of the society. Today as never before, it is important to consolidate the Russian society around the most important milestones of Russian history. It is obvious that without special efforts it is impossible to keep in the public consciousness the knowledge and attitude to the Great Patriotic War necessary for the society and the state as a significant event in Russian and world history.

And finally, it is necessary to realize that the historical memory of the war, of the Great Victory, designed to fulfill the function of consolidating the Russian society, under certain unfavorable conditions, may turn into an occasion for a split, the actualization of problems to which the authorities and society are not objectively fully prepared. Since historical memory is closely connected with the confrontation of socio-political forces, the correct placement of emphasis in analyzing the problems of relations between the government and society during the war is extremely important. Today, the central direction in it is to show the role of the state in uniting all forces, means, resources to achieve victory.

Thus, the Russian government as a whole quite effectively affects the formation of historical consciousness and the preservation of the historical memory of the Russians. The criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of the activity of the authorities is the trend that is being established in the minds of society towards reconciliation of the current supporters of the “white” and “red”; Imperial Russia and the USSR; statists and part of the liberals based on patriotism and the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual. Much has been done in solving this problem by the President of the Russian Federation and those representatives of the elite who share his formula of power – economical liberalism, plus state patriotism. Strengthening state social policy, even while maintaining the mutually agreed compromise of Russian society.

In our opinion, the formula “Sovereignness, Spirituality, Dignity” could be used to attempt to synthesize traditionalist and liberal values in the formation of the historical consciousness and historical memory of our fellow citizens and thereby contribute to their consolidation, the strengthening of the Russian state and the development of civil society, ensuring spiritual and moral security.

## **2. Problem Statement**

The formula “Spirituality, Sovereignness, Dignity” could be used to attempt to synthesize traditionalist and liberal values in the formation of historical consciousness and historical memory of our fellow citizens, which would undoubtedly help to consolidate them, strengthen the Russian state and the development of civil society, ensuring spiritual and moral security.

## **3. Research Questions**

The subject of the research is historical memory as a factor of ensuring the stability of the Russian state and society.

## **4. Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of the article is to substantiate the thesis that the formula “Spirituality, Sovereignness, Dignity” could be used to attempt to synthesize traditionalist and liberal values in the formation of historical consciousness and historical memory of our fellow citizens, which would undoubtedly help to consolidate them, strengthen the Russian state and the development of civil society, ensuring spiritual and moral security.

## **5. Research Methods**

To achieve this goal, we used the following theoretical research methods: theoretical analysis, abstraction, the systematic method, the structural and functional method, the axiomatic method, deduction and induction, the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete.

## **6. Findings**

The given research has demonstrated that the formula “Sovereignness, Spirituality, Dignity” could be used to attempt to synthesize traditionalist and liberal values in the formation of the historical consciousness and historical memory of our fellow citizens and thereby contribute to their consolidation, the strengthening of the Russian state and the development of civil society, ensuring spiritual and moral security.

## **7. Conclusion**

Thus, the Russian government as a whole quite effectively affects the formation of historical consciousness and the preservation of the historical memory of the Russians. The criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of the activity of the authorities is the trend that is being established in the minds of society towards reconciliation of the current supporters of the “white” and “red”; Imperial Russia and the USSR; statist and part of the liberals based on patriotism and the protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual. Much has been done in solving this problem by the President of the Russian Federation and those representatives of the elite who share his formula of power – economical liberalism, plus state

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In our opinion, the formula “ Sovereignness, Spirituality, Dignity” could be used to attempt to synthesize traditionalist and liberal values in the formation of the historical consciousness and historical memory of our fellow citizens and thereby contribute to their consolidation, the strengthening of the Russian state and the development of civil society, ensuring spiritual and moral security.

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