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**THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL ATTITUDES THROUGH
HOLOCAUST LEARNING PROGRAM**

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Abstract

This paper describes the process of the development of moral attitudes among Israeli high-school students when faced with Holocaust moral dilemmas in their Holocaust learning program at school. 102 Israeli high school students aged from 16-17 boys and girls, aged from 16-17 took part in this research voluntarily. They are members of the third generation after the Holocaust which means that they had relatives who were Holocaust victims and survivors. The research was conducted in January 2015, when the students were in the middle of Grade 11 soon after they began the Holocaust Learning Program. The research tool was a Moral Attitudes Questionnaire describing seven dilemmas faced by the Jews during the Holocaust. Students were asked to respond by choosing possible solutions to the dilemmas. In these dilemmas, there is moral tension between solutions based on "deontological morality" versus solutions based on "survival morality". The results revealed a high level of deliberation between the two contradicting options given for each dilemma. However, it revealed that eventually more support was given to solutions based on "survival morality". It is concluded that participants recognized that in the unique reality of the Holocaust this was the "better" solution although it wasn't the "right" (deontological) moral decision.

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Keywords: Deliberation, moral dilemmas, moral attitudes

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1. Introduction

The Holocaust is the name given to the murder of six million Jews in Europe by Nazi Germany during world war II (Greif et al., 1983). The Holocaust ended with the surrender of Nazi Germany on 9th May 1945, but it continues to influence and occupy the Jewish people and the state of Israel in various dimensions: educational, social, cultural and others for generation to come (Weitz, 1997). "Among the generations of Holocaust survivors, the children of the survivors, their grandchildren and great-grandchildren, there is an inter-generational transmission of trauma and memory. This trauma has most central significance for each generation and it influences a variety of areas and levels" (Fuchs, 2009, p. 12). Moral dilemmas focus on the deliberation between a "deontological"- the "right moral" choice - and the "a-moral" or "utilitarian" choice (Christensen & Gomila 2012). "Deontological morality" is morality based on state and sometimes religious laws together with the values of the particular culture and society. It is accepted as normal in a specific society or societies and characterizes moral decisions in standard daily situations (Beauchamp, 1991; Kamm, 1996; Waller, 2005). "Utilitarian morality" is morality that grasps moral action as action that should maximize the benefit for the person who carries out a certain action. As such, this kind of moral behavior could contradict deontological morality (Bredeson, 2011; Gay, 2002). "Survival morality": In extreme situations, facing the danger of death, a decision according to "utilitarian" morality can save life (Koenigs et al., 2007). So, we can say that "survival morality" is actually a kind of utilitarian morality decision. Such a decision would completely contradict the substance of deontological morality. The main and perhaps the only goal of this morality is to preserve lives in the face of great danger. Survival morality is based on moral thinking that has an "instinctive" character and serves the basic human drive for survival. It is an expression of thinking that is often very hasty and sometimes instinctive as the individual tries to find ways to save heir life. "Survival morality" is potentially relevant for all the Holocaust era dilemmas, because the choice of solutions for these dilemmas could lead to either life or death. In these dilemmas, tension exists between solutions that are based on "deontological morality" versus solutions that are based on "survival morality". Survival morality very often characterized Jews' behavior during the Holocaust. Holocaust survivors would usually not have survived if they had acted otherwise (Greif, 1999; Wiesenthal, 2012)

2. Problem Statement

- No research has ever been conducted before on the attitudes of Israeli high school students towards Jewish moral dilemmas in the Holocaust.

3. Research Questions

What will be the level of agreement or disagreement with the different moral behaviors of the Jews during and after the Holocaust of Israeli high school students, who participated in a Holocaust Learning Program?

4. Purpose of the Study

To identify the level of agreement or disagreement with the different moral behaviors of the Jews during and after the Holocaust of Israeli high school students, who participated in a Holocaust Learning Program.

5. Research Methods

5.1. Participants

102 Israeli high school students aged from 16-17.

5.2. Procedure

The research was conducted in January 2015, when the students were in the middle of Grade 11, soon after they began the Holocaust Learning Program.

5.3. Research tool

The research tool was a Moral Attitudes Questionnaire describes seven dilemmas faced by the Jews during the Holocaust. students were asked to respond by choosing possible solutions to the dilemmas

5.4. Data analysis

Data analysis related to the students' responses for each one of the moral dilemmas. Analysis was performed with the tool of descriptive statistics, presenting the distribution of the responses in percentages, the central tendency index – mean, and the deviant tendency index – SD. Each dilemma was analyzed independently in order to examine the specific choice of solution, which indicated the participant's moral attitudes towards each dilemma. It should be noted that the students could chose to mark their agreement or disagreement with either or both of the two solutions given for each dilemma. Therefore, the total number of responses may exceed 102, which is the total number of participants.

6. Findings

Students' initial moral attitudes towards Holocaust-era dilemmas (1939-1945). All the Holocaust era dilemmas involve the need to survive, meaning that the solution could lead to life or death. In these dilemmas, there is moral tension between solutions based on "deontological morality" versus solutions based on "survival morality". Following the presentation of the detailed results in each table for each dilemma, results were sorted into three major categories: "disagreement", "uncertainty" and "agreement". In all tables: (Mean<3 = disagreement; Mean>3 = agreement; Mean>4 = strong agreement). Individual results for each dilemma and some general results are now presented:

Category 1 – *"The collaboration dilemmas"*, including the 'Judenratt dilemma', the 'Sonderkommando dilemma' and the 'Rebel's dilemma'. The main common characteristics of this category are: A. The question of whether or not to cooperate with the Nazis in order to survive. B. The influence of the individual's decision on the wide circle of his community.

6.1. The "Judenratt" (Jewish council) dilemma

The essence of the dilemma is the choice between Jewish leadership's collaboration with the Nazis in the "Ghetto" (A closed, exclusively Jewish area) versus resistance. The outcome of resistance to Nazis orders for the leaders of the Jews was death. The Nazis demanded that the head of the "Judenratt" must prepare lists of Jews, who would be transported to extermination in death camps. Solution A - the survival moral solution is: "I would prepare the list". Solution B - The deontological moral solution is: "I would not prepare the list".

Table 1. Responses to the "Judenratt" dilemma

Time	Solution	Strong disagree 1	Disagree 2	Uncertain 3	Agree 4	Strong agree 5	%	N	Mean	SD
1	A	5.49%	5.49%	35.16%	50.55%	3.30%	100	91	3.41	.87
	B	8.16%	26.53%	34.69%	22.45%	8.16%	100	49	2.96	1.08

'No opinion' for Solution A, N=2; for Solution B, N=1; for 'Other Solution', N=7

As shown in Table 1 The distribution of the responses reveals that Solution A- the survival solution was awarded responses in the following proportions: 11% - disagreement, 35% - uncertainty and 54% - agreement. Solution B - the deontological solution received: 35% - disagreement, 35% - uncertainty and 31% - agreement. *This means that participants agreed more with the survival solution.*

6.2. The "Sonderkommando" (special Jewish forced labor group) dilemma

The essence of the dilemma for the Jewish prisoner is whether to work in forced labor aiding the Nazis' death machine in the death camps versus refusal to do so, which would lead to the prisoner's death. Solution A – The survival moral solution is: "I would work in the Sonderkommando". Solution B – The deontological moral solution is: "I would refuse to work in the Sonderkommando".

Table 2. Responses to the "Sonderkommando" dilemma

Time	Solution	Strong disagree 1	Disagree 2	Uncertain 3	Agree 4	Strong agree 5	%	N	Mean	SD
1	A	2.53%	13.92%	22.78%	40.51%	20.25%	100	79	3.62	1.04
	B	7.94%	15.87%	20.63%	36.51%	19.05%	100	63	3.43	1.20

'No opinion' for Solution A: N=3; for Solution B: N=2, for 'Other Solution' N=3

As shown in Table 2 The distribution of responses reveals that Solution A- the survival solution was awarded responses in the following proportions: 17% - disagreement, 23% - uncertainty and 61% -

agreement. Solution B- the deontological solution was awarded: 24% -disagreement, 21% - uncertainty and 56% - agreement. *This means that participants agreed more with the survival solution.* However, the close results demonstrate the deliberation in this dilemma.

6.3. The "Rebel's dilemma"

The essence of the dilemma is whether to participate in armed rebellion against the Nazis without the wide support of all the Jewish community or on the other hand to avoid rebellion and continue to cooperate with the Nazis. Rebellion could mean sometimes a tiny chance of escaping from the "Ghetto" but the Nazis would probably murder the entire population instantly as a punishment. Solution A – The deontological moral solution is: "I would not join the rebellion without the support of the community".

Table 3. Responses to the "Rebels" dilemma

Time	Solution	Strong disagree 1	Disagree 2	Uncertain 3	Agree 4	Strong agree 5	%	N	Mean	SD
1	A	8.20%	13.11%	21.31%	37.70%	19.67%	100	61	3.48	1.19
	B	7.04%	14.08%	19.72%	42.25%	16.90%	100	71	3.48	1.14

'No opinion' for Solution A: N=5; for Solution B: N=3, for 'Other Solution': N=19

As shown in Table 3 The distribution of the responses reveals that Solution A- the deontological solution was awarded responses in the following proportions: 21% - disagreement, 21% - uncertainty and 68% - agreement. Solution B - the survival solution was awarded: 21% - disagreement, 20% - uncertainty and 59% - agreement. This means that participants agreed more with the deontological solution.

Summary for Category 1 - "the collaboration dilemmas": In two out of the three dilemmas, survival solutions were awarded more agreement than the deontological solutions. However, there was always a high level of deliberation between the two contradicting options.

Category 2 – "The acute dilemmas", includes the 'Crying baby dilemma' and the 'Thief's dilemma'. The main common characteristics of this category are: A. the acute nature of the dilemma – the need to make a rapid decision with no way back. B. the direct influence of the individual's decision on a specific other individual within a very close social circle – his family or a small group of hiding Jews in the 'crying baby dilemma' and the group of prisoners in the extermination camp in the 'thief's dilemma'.

6.4. "The thief's dilemma"

The essence of the dilemma for a Jewish prisoner in death camp is whether to steal food, a shoe, or hat etc. in order to survive or to die if he did not steal the object. Solution A – The deontological moral solution is: "I would not steal a hat from another prisoner". Solution B – The survival moral solution is: "I would steal a hat from another prisoner because if I don't have a hat the Nazis will shoot me".

Table 4. Responses to the "Thief's" dilemma

Time	Solution	Strong disagree 1	Disagree 2	Uncertain 3	Agree 4	Strong agree 5	%	N	Mean	SD
1	A	1.33%	4.00%	32.00%	44.00%	18.67%	100	75	3.75	.86

B	15.52%	25.86%	32.76%	24.14%	1.72%	100	58	2.71	1.06
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'No opinion' for Solution A: N=8; for Solution B: N=5, for 'Other Solution': N=12

As shown in Table 4 The distribution of the responses reveals that Solution A- the deontological solution was awarded responses in the following proportions: 5% - disagreement, 32% - uncertainty and 63% - agreement. Solution B - the survival solution was awarded: 41% - disagreement, 33% - uncertainty and 26% - agreement. *This means that participants agreed more with the deontological solution.*

6.5. The "Crying baby" dilemma

The essence of the dilemma is whether a parent or another person should kill the crying baby, whose incessant crying threatens to expose the group of Jews in their hiding place to the Nazis, who would kill them. Solution A – The survival moral solution is: “I would kill the baby”. Solution B – The deontological moral solution is: “I would not kill the baby”.

Table 5. Responses to the "Crying baby" dilemma

Time	Solution	Strong disagree 1	Disagree 2	Uncertain 3	Agree 4	Strong agree 5	%	N	Mean	SD
1	A	22.81%	15.79%	24.56%	33.33%	3.51%	100	57	2.79	1.24
	B	1.56%	4.69%	17.19%	53.13%	23.44%	100	64	3.92	.86

'No opinion' for Solution A: N=10; for Solution B: N=8, for 'Other Solution': N=15

As shown in Table 5 The distribution of responses reveals that Solution A- the survival solution was awarded responses in the following proportions: 37% - disagreement, 25% - uncertainty and 38% - agreement. Solution B - the deontological solution was awarded: 6% - disagreement, 17% - uncertainty and 77% - agreement. *This means that participants agreed more with the deontological solution.*

Summary for Category 2: "The acute dilemmas," in both dilemmas the deontological solutions were awarded more agreement than the survival solutions.

Category 3 – "The parental dilemmas", including the 'Little Smuggler dilemma' and the 'Giving children away dilemma'. The main common characteristic of this category is the direct influence of the individual – the parent's decision – on his child's fate.

6.6. The "Little Smuggler dilemma"

The essence of the dilemma is whether to allow the child to smuggle food for the starving family into the "Ghetto" (a tiny enclosed Jewish region of the town) or to protect him from the risk of death by stopping him from doing so, thus perhaps risking death by starvation for the entire family. Solution A – The survival moral solution is: "I would allow the child to smuggle". Solution B – The deontological moral solution is: “I would not allow the child to smuggle”.

Table 6. Responses to the "Little smuggler" dilemma

Time	Solution	Strong disagree 1	Disagree 2	Uncertain 3	Agree 4	Strong agree 5	%	N	Mean	SD
1	A		11.25%	22.50%	57.50%	8.75%	100	80	3.64	.80
	B	1.75%	8.77%	43.86%	38.60%	7.02%	100	57	3.40	.82

'No opinion' for Solution A: N=1; for Solution B: N=0, for 'Other Solution': N=8

As shown in Table 6 The distribution of the responses reveals that Solution A- the survival solution was awarded responses in the following proportions: 11% - disagreement, 23% - uncertainty and 66% - agreement. Solution B - the deontological solution was awarded: 11% - disagreement, 44% - uncertainty and 45% - agreement. *This means that participants agreed more with the survival solution.*

6.7. The "Giving away children dilemma"

The essence of the dilemma is whether parents should trust particular gentiles and give their small children to them in order to save their lives, or not to trust them and avoid giving their children away. Solution A – The survival moral solution is: “I would give my child away”. Solution B – The deontological moral solution is: “I would not give my child away”.

Table 7. Responses to the "Giving away children" dilemma

Time	Solution	Strong disagree 1	Disagree 2	Uncertain 3	Agree 4	Strong agree 5	%	N	Mean	SD
1	A	5.38%	1.08%	9.68%	43.01%	40.86%	100	93	4.13	1.01
	B	14.58%	25.00%	31.25%	14.58%	14.58%	100	48	2.90	1.26

'No opinion' for Solution A: N=1; for Solution B: N=0, for 'Other Solution': N=7

As shown in Table 7 The distribution of responses reveals that Solution A- the survival solution was awarded responses in the following proportions: 6% - disagreement, 10% - uncertainty and 84% - agreement. Solution B - the deontological solution was awarded: 40% - disagreement, 30% - uncertainty and 30% - agreement. This means that participants agreed more with the survival solution.

Summary for dilemmas category 3: "The parental dilemmas". It seems that for both dilemmas the survival moral solutions were awarded more agreement than the deontological solutions.

7. Conclusion

Observation of the results for the different dilemmas indicates that there was much variance between the proportions of responses for the survival and the deontological solutions, according to the nature of each dilemma. In order to evaluate the moral attitudes expressed by the students towards the dilemmas it is also helpful to look for common characteristics between them in order to create categories that will enable more profound understanding. This therefore will be the nature of our discussion. All Holocaust era dilemmas can be classified as “high-conflict” dilemmas; such dilemmas appear in threatening situations, such as war, a terrorist attack or natural disasters. As such they are more sensitive

to individual variation and emotional reactivity (Koenigs et al., 2007). Holocaust dilemmas are also "harm to save" (H2S) moral dilemmas in which one must decide whether to kill another person in order to save more lives (ibid.). It should also be remembered that dilemmas relating to physical injury and especially killing of humans (such as Holocaust dilemmas) are more meaningful and arouse stronger emotional reactions (Gillath et al., 2008). Therefore, it is understandable to assume that there will be some similarities as well as some differences between the responses to different dilemmas. The discussion now focuses separately on each category of dilemmas.

Category 1: "The collaboration dilemma"

This category includes the 'Judenratt dilemma', the 'Sonderkommando dilemma' and the 'Rebels' dilemma'. The main common characteristic of these dilemmas is the influence of the individual's decision on the wide circle of his community. Results reveal that in two dilemmas out of three in this category the survival morality solutions were awarded more agreement than the deontological morality solutions with a high level of deliberation between the two contradicting options. Participants' agreement with deontological morality is demonstrated in the differences between the results for the 'Judenratt dilemma' and the 'Sonderkommando dilemma' (Efrat & Baban, 2016a). In the first dilemma, the action of causing harm (making a list of people who will be transferred to be exterminated) is a foreseen action with unintended results performed in order to do achieve a better good - to save yourself, your family and hopefully the rest of the Jews in the 'Ghetto'. This is the reason why participants supported the survival and not the deontological solution. In the 'Sonderkommando dilemma' the action of causing harm (working to assist the Nazis in the process of extermination of the Jews) is less unintentional because the action is performed in a direct manner – however, the harm is unintended but forced. Furthermore, you cannot save any one if you make a deontological decision and refuse to work, you will just die and someone else will take your place. This is the reason why both survival and deontological contradict solutions were awarded support in this dilemma with a little advantage for the survival solution. In the 'Rebel's dilemma', the main question is whether to participate in armed rebellion against the Nazis without the wide support of the Jewish community and Jewish leadership in the "Ghetto" (the Judenratt), which was forced to work under the Nazi regime. In this case, the action of rebellion is not coerced by greater force, it is a voluntary intentional act and the result is expected to be the death of many Jewish people by the Nazis as retaliation for the rebellion. This is the reason that in this dilemma the deontological moral attitude was awarded more support. The conclusion is that in this category participants overall felt and thought that it was better to find solutions according to survival morality, since the effect of such a decision (not to rebel) on a large group of people would perhaps allow some chance of rescue for at least some of the people. When the moral decision affects a smaller number of people, with less or no chances of survival the deliberation is greater regardless of whether the moral action is intentional or not. Consequently, in this category, participants eventually gave more support for the survival moral solutions despite great difficulty and much deliberation that they experienced when deciding to support what for them would usually be unacceptable moral behavior.

Category 2: "The acute dilemmas"

This category includes the 'Crying baby dilemma' and the 'Thieves' dilemma'. The main common characteristic of these dilemmas is the direct influence of the individual's decisions on a specific other individual in a very close social circle. In the "crying baby dilemma" it is the family or a small group of hiding Jews. In the 'thief's dilemma' it is the group of prisoners in the camp. The dilemmas in this category (like all Holocaust dilemmas) are "harm to save" (H2S) moral dilemmas in which one must decide whether to kill another person in order to save more or other lives (Koenigs et al., 2007). In the terrible daily reality of the Holocaust, "more lives" usually included your own life. There are two possible courses of action in these dilemmas: refusing to harm another person despite all possible consequences or saving as many people as possible even at the cost of harming one person, which is known as the 'utilitarian' H2S decision (Koenigs et al., 2007). In both the dilemmas in this category the deontological solutions were awarded more agreement than the survival solutions. These results contradict Greene's (2008) dual-process theory regarding H2S (harm to save) moral dilemmas. According to this theory in H2S moral dilemmas, utilitarian responses will override affective reactions and reduce deontological choices (Greene, 2008). On the other hand, our results are supported by the findings of Starcke, Ludwig and Brand (2012), which indicated that experimental stress conditions in research with healthy volunteers reduce the proportion of utilitarian choices in moral dilemmas. His results suggested that emotional experience might promote deontological decisions in moral dilemmas (Starcke, Ludwig, & Brand, 2012; Youssef et al., 2012). The conclusion is that strong emotional challenge involving intense feelings and difficulty in grasping the kind of horrors undergone in the Holocaust can explain this tendency towards deontological solutions which seem to be more "rational" or "sane" or "appropriate" at this stage when the students had just begun the Holocaust Learning Program.

Category 3: "The parental dilemmas

This category included the 'Little Smuggler dilemma' and the 'Giving children away dilemma'. The main common characteristic of these dilemmas is the direct influence of the parent's decision on his children. In both dilemmas of this category, the survival morality solutions were awarded more agreement than the deontological solutions. This means that participants showed more support for survival solutions, although there was an obvious risk to the child's life, in contrast to the parent's natural instinctual tendency – not to risk their child's life. Choosing the survival solution was significantly clearer in the "Giving children away dilemma" than in the "Little Smuggler dilemma" probably because of the higher risk to the child's life and guilt feelings that the latter dilemma arouses. Our results are supported by Alicke (2000) who found that the development of examinees' guilt feelings depends on the results of their moral decisions: insofar as the decision is more extreme or causes a higher price involving injury to a person's life, then guilt feelings will be greater. Our results are also supported by the findings of Tassy et al. (2013), who noted that variation of the affective proximity between participants and the potential victim (for example a family relative), has been described as influencing moral choice but not moral judgment. The conclusion is that participants preferred to support solutions based on survival morality - to take a risk regarding the life of a single child in order to improve the chances of survival for the child or other family members. They did so, although they recognized that this was not the "right" (deontological) moral decision.

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